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“Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review 
of Abortion Regulations 
Khiara M. Bridges* 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, scholars have been 
preoccupied with the test that ought to be applied to abortion regulations. 
Debate has swirled around the question of whether laws that burden the 
abortion right should be reviewed with strict scrutiny, rational basis 
review, or some other multi-factor or categorical test and at what point 
during pregnancy these tests are appropriate. Moreover, since Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, in which the Court replaced Roe’s trimester 
framework with the undue burden standard, commentators have 
questioned the propriety of this new test. This Article argues that the most 
important change from Roe to the present has not been the test that the 
Court has used to determine the constitutionality of abortion regulations, 
but rather the Court’s departure from the position that Roe took with 
regard to the moral status of the fetus. The Court in Roe either remained 
agnostic on the question of the fetus’s moral status (the tack that the 
majority proclaimed to take) or decided that the fetus was not an entity of 
moral value (the tack that some commentators proclaim was actually 
taken). In stark contrast, the present Court, as demonstrated by its 
opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, appears to have decided that the fetus is a 
morally consequential entity — a “life.” Accordingly, this Article has four 
goals. First, it aims to elaborate the notion of “life” — conceptualized as a 
powerful socio-cultural idea that is not properly understood as equivalent 
to biological life, insofar as “life” has moral consequence and the 
protection and veneration of it is a moral imperative. Second, it aims to 
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demonstrate that the undue burden standard is a balancing test, requiring 
courts to weigh governmental interests against individual liberties. Third, 
it aims to use the example of the undue burden standard to demonstrate 
the general problem with balancing tests in constitutional law and the 
need for a developed theory of governmental interests. Fourth and finally, 
it aims to show that the effectiveness of any balancing test designed to 
protect abortion rights — whether it is strict scrutiny, rational basis 
review, or the undue burden standard — depends on the elements that the 
Court plugs into the test. When the Court plugs “life” into a balancing test 
— that is, when the Court weighs the state’s interest in protecting fetal 
“life” against the woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion — the 
test is guaranteed to protect the abortion right ineffectively. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,1 which famously 
held that a woman enjoyed a fundamental right to terminate a 
pregnancy, many scholars have been preoccupied with the test that 
ought to be applied to abortion regulations. Debate has swirled around 
the question of whether restrictions on abortion should be reviewed 
with strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis review, or 
some other multi-factor or categorical test and, moreover, at what 
point in pregnancy these tests are appropriate. Further, since Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,2 in which the Court replaced Roe’s trimester 
framework with the undue burden standard, commentators have 
questioned the propriety of this new test for determining the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations. These critics queried whether 
the standard is or ought to be a form of intermediate scrutiny, noted 
transformations in its application from case to case, argued that it has 
operated as nothing more than a rational basis review, and articulated 
methodologies for its use. 
This Article contends that the most important change from Roe to 
the present has not been the test that the Court has used when 
reviewing abortion regulations, but rather the Court’s departure from 
the position that Roe took with regard to the moral status of the fetus. 
The Court in Roe either remained agnostic on the question of the 
fetus’s moral status (the tack that the majority proclaimed to take) or 
decided that the fetus was not an entity of moral value (the tack that 
some commentators proclaim was actually taken). At present, and as 
revealed by the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart (“Carhart II”),3 
the Court appears to have decided that the fetus is a morally 
consequential entity of the highest degree — a “life.”4 
“Life,” as used in this Article, is a powerful socio-cultural notion 
that is not properly recognized as synonymous with prosaic biological 
 
 1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 2 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-74 (1992). 
 3 See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). 
 4 This Article uses quotation marks around “life” when the term is used to signify 
the “life” that has moral, theological, or spiritual significance. Quotation marks are 
not used when the term is being use to signify the relatively morally neutral capacity 
that all living biological organisms possess. The important distinctions between these 
two types of life are discussed infra Part I.B.  
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life insofar as “life” has the profoundest of moral consequences. This 
Article argues that judicial treatment of the fetus as a “life” will defeat 
a woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy under all balancing 
tests, including strict scrutiny. Essentially, the effectiveness of any 
balancing test — whether it is strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, 
rational basis review, or the undue burden standard — depends on the 
elements that the Court plugs into the test. When the Court plugs 
“life” into the test and weighs the state’s interest in protecting fetal 
“life” against the woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion, the 
test is guaranteed to be an ineffective protection of the abortion right. 
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I gives a brief history of the 
Court’s articulation of the trimester framework in Roe, its replacement 
with the undue burden standard in Casey, and the wealth of attention 
scholars have given to the question of what test is most appropriate for 
adjudicating the constitutionality of abortion regulations. This Part 
then explores the Court’s use of the undue burden standard over its 
twenty-year tenure. It argues that the test has transformed over the 
years. While the Court has always used the standard to identify and 
strike down those regulations that operate as “substantial obstacles” in 
a woman’s path to an abortion, the test changed insofar as the 
standard now takes into account notions of fetal “life.” That is, Casey 
is not properly understood as having accepted the proposition that the 
fetus is a “life”; indeed, Casey rejected the opportunity to do so. 
Moreover, that rejection was reflected in the way that the Court used 
the undue burden standard, as the test was used to strike down the 
spousal notification provision of the Pennsylvania law at issue. 
Essentially, the Court held that the woman’s interest in obtaining an 
abortion outweighed the state’s interest in protecting the fetus — a 
holding that would be impossible if the fetus were conceptualized as a 
“life.” However, the Court’s most recent use of the undue burden 
standard in Carhart II, upholding a federal statute that proscribes a 
particular method of performing second and third trimester abortions, 
demonstrates a remarkable departure from Roe’s and Casey’s refusal to 
accept that proposition of fetal “life.” The vocabulary and the imagery 
that the Court uses when speaking of the fetus, as well as the 
reasoning deployed in arriving at the conclusion that the proscription 
of the abortion method at issue did not impose an undue burden on 
the abortion right, makes it fairly obvious that the Court proceeded 
from the assumption that the fetus is a morally-significant, profound, 
vulnerable “life.” 
Part II investigates what kind of constitutional test the undue 
burden standard has demonstrated itself to be. Although some 
scholars argue that the undue burden standard is not a balancing test, 
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but rather an effects test wherein the reviewing court quantifies the 
burden that a regulation places on the right, this Part concludes 
otherwise. It understands the test as one that calls for a court to 
balance the woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy against the state’s 
interest in protecting the fetus. When, in any given instance, the state’s 
interest in protecting the fetus outweighs the woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy, an undue burden will not be found and the 
regulation will be upheld. Alternatively, when the woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy is found to outweigh the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal life in a given instance, an undue burden will be found 
and the regulation will be struck down as unconstitutional. 
Having established the undue burden standard as a balancing test, 
Part III next turns to the general problem of balancing tests — that is, 
tests that are designed to balance individual rights and liberties against 
governmental interests. This Part explores the questions that have 
vexed scholars for decades: on what universal scale of values may 
governmental interests be weighed against individual rights and 
liberties? How may the Court arrive at the determination that a 
proffered governmental interest is or is not sufficiently weighty to 
defeat an individual right? This Part explores this issue in the context 
of scholarship criticizing the absence of a theory concerning what 
ought to constitute a compelling governmental interest sufficient to 
survive strict scrutiny. This Part puts the discussion about this lack of 
theory in conversation with the advent of fetal “life” and the 
protection thereof as state interests. This Part concludes that the 
protection of fetal “life” as a state interest underscores the need for a 
developed theory of governmental interests, compelling or otherwise. 
Part IV argues that when the protection of fetal “life” is a state 
interest against which any individual right or liberty is weighed, it 
most assuredly will be deemed weightier than that against which it is 
balanced. Essentially, fetal “life” confounds all balancing tests, from the 
undue burden standard to strict scrutiny. “Life,” as culturally 
constructed, is such a weighty proposition — endowed, as it is, with 
spiritual and theological significance — that it necessarily outweighs 
any individual right. This Part contends that, for this reason and 
others, “life” must be extracted from the analysis. A brief conclusion 
follows. 
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I. ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE AND FETAL “LIFE” 
A. A Bit of Background: From Roe to Casey 
In 1973, the Court announced what was to be one of its most 
controversial, beloved, reviled, celebrated, and denounced decisions 
— Roe v. Wade.5 Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, which 
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
properly interpreted to provide women with a fundamental right to 
terminate a pregnancy,6 thus requiring courts to use strict scrutiny 
when reviewing regulations that restricted abortion.7 However, the 
state’s dual interests in protecting a woman’s health and protecting the 
prenatal life that she sustains were in tension with the abortion right.8 
Thus, Roe erected a structure for determining when during a woman’s 
pregnancy those competing state interests become compelling and 
could legitimately prevail over the woman’s fundamental right.9 This 
was the trimester framework: 
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first 
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s 
attending physician. 
 
 5 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  
 6 Id. (arguing that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action” supported the right to privacy, which encompassed a 
woman’s decision whether to undergo an abortion).  
 7 Although the Court never uses the phrase “strict scrutiny” when describing the 
level of scrutiny reviewing courts should use when evaluating abortion regulations, 
the Court calls the abortion right, and the right to privacy under which it is found, 
“fundamental” and asserts that it can be abridged only by “compelling” state interests 
— hallmarks of strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 155; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943-44 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that the government cannot 
infringe on “fundamental rights . . . unless strict scrutiny is met; that is, the 
government’s action must be necessary to achieve a compelling purpose”).  
 8 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (arguing that the abortion right “is not absolute and is 
subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection 
of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant”).  
 9 The Court argued that the state’s interest in protecting women’s health becomes 
compelling after the first trimester, when abortion entails more medical risks than 
enduring labor and childbirth. See id. at 163. Further, the Court argued that the state’s 
interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling at the point of fetal viability, which 
occurred at the tail end of the second trimester, “because the fetus then presumably 
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” Id. For a discussion 
of criticism about this particular announcement, see infra Part III.B.1. 
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(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the 
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health 
of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion 
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal 
health. 
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in 
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if 
it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe abortion except where 
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother.10 
Roe’s nineteen-year tenure as the law of the land was far from quiet. 
While the decision had its fair share of supporters, it was also 
vigorously critiqued. The loudest criticism from the academy was 
concerned with the question of whether the Constitution actually 
supported a fundamental right to an abortion.11 Related to this was the 
question of what level of review was appropriate for laws that 
regulated abortion.12 Disagreement about the answers to these 
questions was as passionate as people’s feelings about abortion. 
Moreover, Roe was constantly tested by state legislatures. Indeed, 
the Court heard several cases that sought to challenge, limit, or 
overrule the decision.13 However, it was not until Casey that Roe and 
 
 10 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. 
 11 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973) (“What is frightening about Roe is that this super-
protected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers’ 
thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the 
provisions they included, or the nation’s governmental structure.”). 
 12 See, e.g., id. at 928 (disputing that abortion regulations require something more 
than a “baseline requirement of ‘rationality’”). 
 13  See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (upholding a 
Missouri law prohibiting abortions from being performed in public facilities, 
prohibiting public employees from providing information regarding abortion, and 
increasing the cost of abortion by requiring viability testing of fetuses that are twenty 
weeks gestational age and older); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764, 766 (1986) (striking down regulations requiring 
“informed consent” as well as the filing of reports regarding abortions conducted in 
the state that were to be made publicly available); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 435, 450 (1983) (invalidating “informed consent,” 
waiting period, and hospitalization requirements); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
326-27 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal 
Medicaid funds for even “medically necessary” abortions — excepting abortions 
sought subsequent to incest or rape); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41, 643-44 
(1979) (upholding a regulation requiring unmarried, pregnant minors to obtain 
parental consent to their abortions or, alternatively, to demonstrate to a court during a 
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its trimester framework were officially laid to rest.14 While Casey 
reaffirmed Roe’s “essential holding,”15 it rejected Roe’s trimester 
framework and replaced it with a new analytic for evaluating the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations — the undue burden 
standard.16 The undue burden standard requires reviewing courts to 
determine whether a regulation places a “substantial obstacle” in a 
woman’s path to an abortion prior to the viability of her fetus.17 Post-
viability abortions remain subject to proscription provided that 
exceptions are made for abortions necessary to save the life or health 
of the woman.18 The standard represented a plurality of the Court’s 
dissatisfaction with states’ inability under the trimester framework to 
protect the fetal life sustained by the woman.19 The standard was 
 
judicial bypass procedure that they are either mature enough to make the decision on 
their own or that abortion is in their best interests); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 
(1977) (upholding a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of Medicaid funds for 
nontherapeutic abortions and finding that the prohibition, which effectively precluded 
the most indigent women from exercising their abortion rights, was consistent with 
the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52, 54 (1976) (striking down regulations requiring spousal consent for 
married women’s abortions and prohibiting saline amniocentesis, which was the most 
widely used method of performing second trimester abortions at the time). 
 14 Part of the reason why the Court professed to uphold the “essential holding” of 
Roe was precisely because Roe’s reign as law of the land had been far from quiet, and 
“to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a 
watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious 
question.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). 
 15 Id. at 846. 
 16 Id. at 876. A finding that a regulation is an “undue burden” on the abortion 
right simply means that the law unconstitutionally places a “substantial obstacle” in 
the woman’s path to an abortion. Id. at 877. Unfortunately, the decision offered very 
little guidance to lower courts as to how they ought to arrive at the conclusion that a 
law does or does not amount to a “substantial obstacle.” See Gillian K. Metzger, 
Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2027 (1994) (noting Casey’s “failure to provide 
a systematic methodology by which to apply” the undue burden standard); Linda J. 
Wharton, Susan Frietsche & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 323 (2006) (noting that 
the plurality “stumbled in its efforts to adequately clarify the contours of the undue 
burden standard”). 
 17 Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of 
law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”). 
 18 Id. at 846 (confirming the necessity of a life and health exception for post-
viability abortions). However, the principle that abortion regulations must contain 
exceptions to protect women’s health is weakened by Carhart II, which upheld the 
federal PBA despite its lack of a health exception. See discussion infra Part I.B.4. 
 19 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (finding that “a necessary reconciliation of the liberty of 
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designed to enable states to demonstrate respect for fetal life — and 
encourage women to demonstrate this respect by carrying the fetus to 
term — at all stages of a woman’s pregnancy.20 
Casey and the undue burden standard’s tenure as the law of the 
land, like Roe and the trimester framework, drew forth much 
controversy and criticism.21 Moreover, while much disapproval comes 
from the political right,22 a fair share of disapproval comes from the 
political left, who are critical of the impotence that the undue burden 
standard has demonstrated as protection of a woman’s right to 
terminate a pregnancy.23 Indeed, the only abortion regulation that the 
Court has used the undue burden standard to strike down was the 
spousal notification provision at issue in Casey.24 
Although the undue burden standard, when first articulated, was 
never a particularly tough defender of the abortion right (by design or 
 
the woman and the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our 
view, that we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all 
previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life”). 
 20 See id. (noting that “the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the 
pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child”). 
 21 See Wharton et al., supra note 16, at 320-21 (noting that the Casey has been 
challenged quite vigorously and that “[i]n the first four months of 2006 alone, 
legislators in fourteen states proposed measures to ban virtually all abortion 
procedures, and the South Dakota legislature passed, but voters rejected, the nation’s 
first post-Casey abortion ban”). 
 22 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 954-56 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that what qualifies as an “undue burden” “is a value judgment” 
that “can not be demonstrated true or false by factual inquiry or legal reasoning,” and 
concluding, twice, that “Casey must be overruled”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 985-87 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the undue burden standard is “unprincipled in origin,” 
“hopelessly unworkable in practice,” and “ultimately standardless”). 
 23 See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the 
Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 291 (2010) 
(arguing that the undue burden test “has fostered extensive encroachments on 
women’s personal privacy” and that Casey “opened the door to physical, familial, and 
spiritual invasions of women’s privacy that serve little purpose but public shaming and 
humiliation”); Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection 
for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 
471 (2009) (arguing that the “undue burden standard has proven to be far less 
protective of abortion rights than the Roe standard”).  
 24 In fairness, the Court did use the undue burden standard to strike down a 
Nebraska “partial-birth” abortion ban that was quite similar to the federal version of 
the ban at issue in Carhart II. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 945-46 (finding the Nebraska 
statute unconstitutional). However, Carhart II arguably represents the overruling of 
Carhart I sub silentio. If so, it remains true that the only abortion regulation that the 
Court has used the undue burden standard to strike down is the spousal notification 
provision at issue in Casey. 
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by happenstance25), it is woefully anemic in its present incarnation. 
Specifically, the Court has built notions of fetal “life” into the 
standard. The next subpart explores this concept of fetal “life” and 
explains how it differs from biological life. This Part goes on to trace 
the Court’s conceptualization of the fetus’s moral status in Roe, Casey, 
and Stenberg v. Carhart [“Carhart I”]. Part I concludes by 
demonstrating that the Court in Carhart II conceptualized the fetus as 
a representation of “life” and incorporated that understanding of the 
fetus’s moral status into the undue burden standard — a striking 
departure from the Court’s earlier understanding of the fetus and the 
standard. 
B. On “Life” 
When a person asserts that abortion is wrong because the fetus is “a 
life,” the “life” referenced needs no definition: upon hearing the 
signifier, the hearer knows that what is being signified is distinct from 
biological life and dutifully conjures up notions of a precious, sacred26 
entity that must be revered, respected, and protected.27 “Life” is that to 
which esteemed philosopher and legal academic Ronald Dworkin 
refers when he writes: “[H]uman life has an intrinsic, innate value, 
that human life is sacred just in itself; and that the sacred nature of a 
human life begins when its biological life begins, even before the 
 
 25 Linda Wharton, Susan Frietsche, and Kathryn Kolbert, who represented the 
plaintiff-reproductive health providers in Casey, have argued that the undue burden 
standard was actually intended to be a tough defender of the abortion right; however, 
its misapplication by lower courts has rendered it frail. See Wharton et al., supra note 
16, at 319, 323 (arguing that the standard was meant to offer “meaningful protection” 
of the abortion right and claiming that the plurality’s “passionate discussion of the 
benefits that reproductive liberty had bestowed upon generations of women and their 
prospects for full equality” buttress the notion that the plurality intended that the 
standard provide substantial defense of the right); id. at 255 (arguing that lower courts 
“have not been faithful to Casey’s promise”).  
 26 This Article insists that “life” ought to be understood as a secular concept, 
although its origins may be in religion — analogous to the way that the assertion that 
the fetus is a morally consequential entity ought to be understood as a secular 
assertion, although many religions share the same view. See discussion infra note 188. 
 27 Borgmann has helpfully distinguished “thin” and “thick” conceptions of life. See 
Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of ‘Life’: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate, 18 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 557-58 (2009). She defines the “thin” conception of life 
as referencing “the fact that a blastocyst, or embryo, or fetus, is a human organism 
that is in the process of developing into a full person.” Id. at 592. Counterpoised to 
this is the “thick” conception of life — a life that “carries a moral urgency and 
legitimacy.” Id. at 597. Borgmann’s “thick” life corresponds to the “life” to which this 
Article refers. 
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creature whose life it is has movement or sensation or interests or 
rights of its own.”28 “Life” is that to which people refer when they 
describe life as a “supreme value”; it is that which is invoked when 
people note the “sanctity of life,” the “dignity of life,” the “inherent 
value” of life, the “intrinsic goodness” of life, “the intrinsic worth” of 
life, the “infinite value” of life, and the “inviolability of life.”29 
Yet, “life” acquires its power because it has no precise definition.30 It 
is an abstraction without content; it means everything that those who 
evoke it desire because it denotes nothing with precision.31 As 
explained by historian Barbara Duden, “Life itself is not an amoeba 
word, since it does not have any application as a technical term in 
scientific discourse. Unlike zygote and fetus, it does not stem from the 
language of a disciplinary thought collective. . . . [T]he semantic trap 
into which the use of ‘a life’ leads is not due primarily to its ambiguity 
but to its vapidity.”32 
Any thorough account of “life” must mention its vulnerability. 
“Life” is easily undervalued, frequently misrecognized, and cavalierly 
destroyed; accordingly, it is in need of constant protection.33 Indeed, 
 
 28 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 11 (1993). 
 29 GEOFFREY G. DRUTCHAS, IS LIFE SACRED? 3 (1998). 
 30 Many have attempted to define “life” with precision, however. See, e.g., Stephen 
C. Hicks, The Right to Life in Law: The Embryo and Fetus, the Body and Soul, the Family 
and Society, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 805, 826 (1992) (arguing that if “[life] cannot refer 
to the species and does not refer to living beings, or to living a life, then it may refer to 
God, the soul, or the spirit”). 
 31 Carol Sanger has done illuminating work tracing the popularization of “life” 
within cultural discourse. See generally Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: 
Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 802 (2006) (observing the 
work that the administration of George W. Bush accomplished in disseminating 
notions of “life” through its campaign to create a “culture of life” in the United States).  
 32 BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES ON PREGNANCY AND THE 
UNBORN 75 (1993); cf. Borgmann, supra note 27, at 599 (noting the “vague” nature of 
the signifier “life” and describing it as a “code word”); id. at 586 (describing “life” as 
“slippery”). The “slipperiness” of life, as a word, is quite substantial. Thus, when 
Bristol Palin titles her autobiography Not Afraid of Life, it is unclear whether she 
means that she is not afraid of life in the sense of the series of frequently unexpected 
events that occur to a person from birth to death. Alternatively, she may mean that she 
is not afraid of life in the sense of “life” — the object of her unplanned pregnancy that 
she carried to term while still a teenager and while her mother was the running mate 
of Senator John McCain during his 2008 Presidential bid: “When the doctor laid Tripp 
in my arms, I knew this baby was not a mistake. Having sex outside of marriage was 
the mistake. But this baby? He was — and is — a blessing.” BRISTOL PALIN, NOT AFRAID 
OF LIFE: MY JOURNEY SO FAR 153 (2011).  
 33 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S878-02, S880 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of 
President George W. Bush) (“Because a society is measured by how it treats the weak 
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part of the reason why “life” cannot be spoken about dispassionately is 
because the protection of it — the work of convincing, or compelling, 
others to defer to it — frequently means that the “liberty” of those 
who do not recognize or believe in “life” is constrained.34 The contest 
over abortion is frequently fought on this terrain. 
Finally, it is important to note that “life” is distinct from “person”; 
one may believe that the fetus is not a “person” in the constitutional 
sense, yet remain convinced that a fetus is a “life” bearing the 
weightiest of moral statuses.35 Due to the profound vulnerability of the 
fetus, the gravity of its moral status as a non-”person,” a “life,” may be 
thought to exceed the gravity of the moral status of the not always 
vulnerable “person.” Indeed, Roe maintained the distinction between 
fetal personhood and fetal moral status, arguing that the fetus is not a 
“person” within the meaning of the Constitution, while shortly 
thereafter arguing that it need not decide the difficult question of 
when “life” begins.36 
The next sections trace the Court’s understanding of the fetus’s 
moral consequence in Roe, Casey, Carhart I, and Carhart II. The 
discussion should demonstrate that, while the Court did not 
apprehend the fetus as a “life” in the first three cases, Carhart II 
represents a dramatic departure from this precedent. Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion reveals the Court’s unapologetic acceptance of fetal 
“life.” Moreover, Carhart II’s apparent and unmistakable appreciation 
of the fetus as “life” has profound consequences for the undue burden 
standard, an argument that Part II begins to make. 
1. The Fetus in Roe 
The Court in Roe went to great lengths to remain agnostic on the 
question of the fetus’s moral status. While it definitively answered the 
 
and vulnerable, we must strive to build a culture of life.”); George W. Bush, U.S. 
President, Remarks at the Dedication of the Pope John Paul II Cultural Center, (Mar. 
22, 2001), in 1 PUB. PAPERS 284 (“In the culture of life, we must make room for the 
stranger. We must comfort the sick. We must care for the aged. We must welcome the 
immigrant. We must teach our children to be gentle with one another. We must defend 
in love the innocent child waiting to be born.”) (emphasis added).  
 34 Jennifer M. Miller, Understanding Fetal Pain: How Changed Circumstances 
Demand a Legal Response, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 463, 494 (2006) (“If we recognize a fetus 
as a ‘life,’ then the privacy right of the mother is eliminated from the equation, and the 
fetus is worthy of protection.”). 
 35 Id. (noting that “a fetus, therefore, might not be a person in a formalistic sense, 
but it is still a human being”). 
 36 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (noting that the Court does not need to 
address the question of where life begins).  
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question (in the negative) of whether the fetus was a “person” under 
the United States Constitution,37 it did not similarly answer the 
question of whether the fetus is a moral entity deserving of some 
manner of deference. The Court professed not to answer this question, 
attempting to create an abortion jurisprudence around an agnosticism 
as to the fetus’s moral status.38 
Roe owes much of its length to the Court’s history of thought 
concerning the fetus39 — a history that leads the Court to conclude 
that the fetus’s moral status has been, since time immemorial, the 
subject of much debate and disagreement. In the face of thousands of 
years marked by the failure of a moral consensus concerning the fetus 
to develop, the Court refuses to ensconce one particular version of 
fetal moral ontology into American constitutional law. The corollary 
to this refusal is the Court forbidding individual states from 
ensconcing one version into state law.40 Hence, we arrive at the 
Court’s eloquent attestation of agnosticism: “We need not resolve the 
difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the 
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are 
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the 
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as 
to the answer.”41 
However, some argue that the Court in Roe protested too much 
about its desire not to answer the question about the fetus’s moral 
status. These scholars contend that it did just that in prohibiting states 
from proscribing abortion prior to fetal viability. For example, Michael 
Sandel argues that, despite Roe’s protestations that it was being neutral 
with respect to the fetus’s moral status, it implicitly decided that the 
fetus was not an entity of moral consequence when it interpreted the 
Constitution to provide for a right to an abortion.42 He contends that, 
 
 37 Id. at 158 (stating that the Court is persuaded that “the word ‘person,’ as used in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn”). 
 38 For a critique of the professed agnosticism of Roe and the more general position 
that the constitutionality of abortion can be adjudicated without determining the 
moral status of the fetus, see Borgmann, supra note 27, at 555-56 (concluding that the 
moral question of the fetus must be answered in order to permit abortion).  
 39 Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-47 (discussing the wide divergence of thinking about the 
fetus throughout history and noting the absence of a moral consensus in the U.S. on 
the issue at the time of the decision). 
 40 Id. at 162 (“[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may 
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”). 
 41 Id. at 159. 
 42 See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and 
Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 532 (1989) (arguing that the Court did not 
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just as one has tacitly decided that the slave is not a “person” in the 
constitutional sense when one permits slavery, analogously, one tacitly 
decides that the fetus is not a morally-consequential entity when one 
permits abortion.43 He concludes by stating the following: “That the 
Court’s decision in Roe presupposes a particular answer to the 
question it purports to bracket is no argument against its decision, 
only an argument against its claim to have bracketed the controversial 
question of when life begins. It does not replace Texas’s theory of life 
with a neutral stance, but with a different theory of its own.”44 
If Sandel and likeminded scholars45 are correct and Roe held, albeit 
implicitly, that the fetus is not a morally consequential entity, then 
Carhart II represents the most dramatic of departures from this 
holding. This shift occurs because Carhart II not only holds (again, 
implicitly) that the fetus is a morally consequential entity, but also 
regards the fetus as a morally consequential entity of the highest 
degree — a “life.” 
2. The Fetus in Casey 
Casey represents the dissatisfaction that a plurality of the Court had 
with the trimester framework and the way that it functioned to 
prohibit the state from “show[ing] its concern for the life of the 
unborn”46 in the earlier stages of a woman’s pregnancy. Indeed, Casey 
is much more sympathetic than Roe to state legislators who believe in 
 
“bracket” the question of when life begins, but rather implicitly answered that it did 
not begin prior to viability).  
 43 See id. (making this analogy). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS 14 (2008) (“When life 
begins and when it ends must necessarily be decided as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, because basic guarantees depend on it . . . . However much the Court 
might want to avoid the question, or appear not to have to answer it, the definition of 
life, at least at the margins, is a subject necessarily inherent in the meaning of certain 
constitutional guarantees.”); John T. Noonan, Posner’s Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1768, 1772 n.24 (1998) (arguing that the Court’s “professed agnosticism as to when 
life begins . . . is not a morally neutral position; it is a rejection of a fundamental 
postulate of the law the decision holds unconstitutional”); see also Borgmann, supra 
note 27, at 556 (“By purporting to leave the question for each individual to decide, the 
Court has not dodged the question but rather has effectively rejected a belief in fetal 
personhood, for if an embryo or fetus is a person, abortions must be prohibited, and 
women who obtain abortions are as culpable as the doctors who perform them.”). It is 
important to note that Borgmann conflates fetal personhood and the moral status of 
the fetus. In contrast, this Article distinguishes the two concepts. See discussion supra 
Part I.B. 
 46 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992). 
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the moral consequence of the fetus and believe abortion to be a moral 
wrong that ought to be avoided at all costs. While Roe silenced those 
legislators and tied their hands during the first two trimesters, Casey 
made explicit provision for them to speak to the woman and attempt 
to convince her that the decision that she endeavored to effect was a 
grave error. 
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact 
rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that 
there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that 
can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to 
full term and that there are procedures and institutions to 
allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain 
degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the 
child herself. The Constitution does not forbid a State or 
city . . . from expressing a preference for normal 
childbirth. . . . [This is] the inevitable consequence of our 
holding that the State has an interest in protecting the life of 
the unborn.47 
While Casey is sympathetic to legislatures that subscribe to notions of 
the moral consequence of the fetus, and even to fetal “life,” the Court 
itself does not appear to be committed to those same ideas. The 
language that the Court uses when speaking about the fetus is far from 
evocative or passionate48 — much unlike the Court’s language in 
Carhart II.49 Similarly, Casey uses no suggestive images — again, much 
unlike the Court in Carhart II. The Casey Court appears to give 
respectful deference to those who may be passionate about the fetus 
and the “life” that it is believed to embody, while refusing to indicate 
whether or not it shares those beliefs.50 The Court presents itself as a 
 
 47 Id. at 872-73 (citations omitted). 
 48 Arguably, the most intense language used in the opinion concerns the 
vulnerability of the Court’s legitimacy should it not honor stare decisis in the case 
before it. See id. (“A willing breach of [the promise to remain steadfast] would be 
nothing less than a breach of faith . . . .”); id. at 868 (“Like the character of an 
individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time . . . . The Court’s 
concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation 
to which it is responsible.”). 
 49 See discussion infra Part I.B.4.  
 50 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (stating that abortion is “an act fraught with 
consequences for others,” including “society[,] which must confront the knowledge 
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem short of an act of violence against 
innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that 
is aborted”).  
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neutral arbiter called upon to broker a peace between warring factions, 
declining to say whose side it thinks should win.51 
One criticism that could be levied at this stage in the argument is to 
observe that the Court in Casey used the newly established undue 
burden standard to uphold four out of five provisions of the 
Pennsylvania regulation under review. Does this holding not evidence 
a Court that has accepted the fetus as a “life” and, consequently, is 
partial to protecting it? This question must be answered in the 
negative. The Court in Casey, undoubtedly, is partial to allowing 
opponents of a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy the 
opportunity to present their views. However, this permission is not 
granted because the Court necessarily subscribes to those views and 
wields the undue burden standard as a tool for vindicating them. 
The provisions of the Pennsylvania law that were held to be 
constitutional and that arguably evidenced a Court convinced of fetal 
“life” are the parental consent requirements for minors52 and the 
general informed consent requirements obliging women to hear 
specific information (regarding the adoption alternative, the 
availability of public assistance for indigent mothers, fathers’ child 
support responsibilities, and the availability of state-authored 
published materials describing the fetus).53 The parental consent 
provision required that unemancipated minors obtain the consent of a 
parent or guardian or, alternatively, demonstrate to a court pursuant 
to a judicial bypass procedure that either she is mature enough to 
make the abortion decision on her own or that the abortion is in her 
best interests.54 It is true that a Court subscribing to the fetus as “life” 
might uphold a parental consent requirement such as this, 
understanding it as another useful obstacle to put in the path to an 
abortion — an obstacle that may function as an absolute barrier to 
abortion — and, in so doing, save the “life” of the fetus. But, the Court 
 
 51 Indeed, the Court expressly describes itself as a peacemaker. See id. at 867 
(describing the task at hand as interpreting the Constitution in such a way as to bring 
“the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division”).  
 52 Id. at 899-900. 
 53 Id. at 881. The other sections of the Pennsylvania law that were upheld in Casey 
were a recordkeeping and reporting requirement (excepting a provision that was 
inconsistent with the Court’s invalidation of the spousal notification requirement) as 
well as a definition of those events that qualified as a “medical emergency,” thereby 
making inapplicable the provisions requiring general informed consent and parental 
consent. Id. at 880, 901. The fifth provision of the Pennsylvania law at issue, the 
spousal notification requirement, was struck down as an undue burden on the 
abortion right. Id. at 898. 
 54 Id. at 899. 
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in Casey does not understand the requirement in this way (at least not 
ostensibly so). Again, the Court’s discussion of the provision’s 
constitutionality is notably devoid of a vocabulary demonstrating a 
reverence and awe of the “life” that might be saved subsequent to a 
minor’s consultation with an adult. Although it does nod to the 
“values and moral or religious principles”55 of the minor’s family, it 
simply looks to precedent and finds the Pennsylvania regulation 
consistent with it.56 
Similarly, it is true that a Court subscribing to the fetus as “life” 
might uphold the general informed consent requirements found 
constitutional in Casey, understanding them as an obstacle that may 
function to save the “life” of the fetus. But, again, this is not how the 
Court talks about the Pennsylvania regulation. Instead, the discussion 
of the law is consistent with a Court that feels that those convinced of 
fetal “life” were illegitimately and unfairly silenced under the Roe 
framework and is now committed to allowing them an opportunity to 
speak — even if their speech is designed to convince a woman to 
continue her pregnancy.57 Like the disinterested mediator that it takes 
itself to be, the Court does not show its cards on how it, if asked, 
would answer the question of the fetus’s moral status. 
This discussion does not argue that the Court’s disinterest translates 
into a willingness to allow the state convinced of fetal “life” to say 
anything to the woman. The Court notes that the materials that 
Pennsylvania produced relate to abortion’s “consequences to the 
fetus”58; it notes that the materials, which explore “fetal development,” 
 
 55 Id. at 900. 
 56 Id. at 899. Much scholarship has focused on the negative effects occasioned by 
parental involvement statutes — specifically the requirement that pregnant minors 
seek permission to obtain an abortion from a court if they cannot obtain permission 
from their parents. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, An Anthropological Meditation on Ex 
Parte Anonymous: A Judicial Bypass Procedure for a Minor’s Abortion, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
215, 241-42 (2006) (arguing that judges assigned the task to grant or deny a judicial 
waiver of parental consent requirements inevitably incorporate cultural assumptions 
about gender, pregnancy, age, and emotion into their “readings” of a petitioning 
minor’s testimony — an incorporation that has detrimental consequences for minors 
whose subjective experiences are inconsistent with those cultural assumptions); Carol 
Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 
18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 418 (2009) (“[B]ypass hearings serve less to evaluate 
the quality of a young woman’s decision than to punish her for making it. The 
hearings provide an opportunity to inflict a kind of legal harm — harm by process — 
on young women seeking to abort.”).  
 57 Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (noting that the information that the state gives women 
via the informed consent process may express the state’s “preference for childbirth 
over abortion”). 
 58 Id. at 882. 
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are “truthful and not misleading”59 and are designed to force the 
woman to consider the “effect on the fetus.”60 Notably, the materials 
upheld say nothing explicit about the state’s views on the fetus’s moral 
status. The information that Pennsylvania sought to give to women 
might have caused some women to forego abortion because they 
became convinced that the physical capacities possessed by their fetus 
made it more like an infant than not, thereby making their abortion 
more like infanticide than not. However, the information that 
Pennsylvania sought to give women did not endeavor to accomplish 
this same aim by expressly arguing that the fetus is a “life” and that 
abortion is the immoral extermination of this “life.” Given Casey’s 
description of the materials that it held to be constitutional, and given 
its explicit directive that the materials be “truthful and nonmisleading” 
in order to pass constitutional muster, it is far from obvious that the 
Casey Court would reach the same conclusion about materials 
explicitly avowing that the fetus is a “life.”61 That is, Casey offered an 
 
 59 Id. at 882-83. 
 60 Id. at 883; see also id. at 882 (overruling the holdings in Akron I and Thornburgh 
because they found a “constitutional violation when the government requires, as it 
does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the 
procedure . . . and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus”). 
 61 This is to argue that Casey says nothing about the constitutionality of the “new” 
brand of informed consent to abortion statutes that attempt to dissuade women from 
their decision to terminate their pregnancies by presenting as fact specific arguments 
about the fetus’s moral status. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2010) 
(requiring that women be told as part of the informed consent process that their 
abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being”); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2010) (same). These laws are problematic because 
of the moral coercion they attempt to accomplish under the guise of respecting 
women’s autonomy as rational decisionmakers. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, 
Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading 
Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) (noting the “inappropriate emotional influence” 
that the “new” informed consent statutes can have); cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, The 
First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 1010-11 
(2009) (“[T]he mandatory morals lecture discredits a woman’s ability to make adult 
decisions by assuming she has not adequately thought through the moral 
repercussions and cannot do so without state intervention. In other words, the insult 
to agency is not that the state will succeed in changing the woman’s mind, but the 
very fact that it tries.”). There is a serious question as to whether the information 
given qualifies as “truthful and nonmisleading.” See Blumenthal, supra, at 27 (noting 
that the information given under the “new” informed consent statute might be 
misleading because they take “advantage of emotional influence to bias an individual’s 
decision away from the decision that would be made in a non-emotional, fully 
informed state”); Corbin, supra, at 1008-11 (arguing that the information states 
attempt to give women under the “new” informed consent statutes is frequently 
“misleading, if not inaccurate”). 
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undue burden standard that would give those certain of fetal “life” an 
opportunity to speak, not an opportunity to make moral arguments. 
However, it may be unlikely that a Court convinced of fetal “life” 
would prohibit states from attempting to convince pregnant women 
that they carry “life” and ought not to terminate it. 
The Court also upheld the Pennsylvania informed consent 
regulation’s requirement of a twenty-four hour waiting period.62 
Again, Casey’s discussion of the provision hardly evidences a Court 
committed to protecting fetal “life.” The Court concedes that the 
waiting period may have the effect of “protecting the life of the 
unborn” by dissuading women from undergoing abortion.63 But, this 
protection is a consequence of the woman having had time to reflect 
on the physical capacities that her fetus possesses, the possibility of 
giving the infant up for adoption, her eligibility for state assistance for 
indigent mothers if she carried the pregnancy to term, and the child 
support obligations that her fetus-cum-infant’s father has to provide64 
— not because the waiting period makes extremely difficult or 
downright impossible a woman’s attempt to effectuate her decision to 
abort. The Court, blissfully unaware that it is writing the plurality’s 
class privilege into constitutional law, goes to some length to deny 
that the waiting period would have the practical effect of making 
abortion substantially more difficult for anybody.65 This is not a Court 
motivated by a moral imperative to save fetal “life”; this is a Court that 
is blind to the fact that there is “another world out there”66 in which 
 
 62 Casey, 505 U.S. at 887. 
 63 Id. at 885. 
 64 Id. (noting that the waiting period allows the woman’s decision to be more 
“informed and deliberate” as a “period of reflection” will follow the woman’s receipt of 
information encouraging her to carry the pregnancy to term). 
 65 Id. at 886-87 (disagreeing with the district court’s finding that the waiting 
period must be struck down because it will be “particularly burdensome” on some 
groups of women, noting that “[a] particular burden is not of necessity a substantial 
obstacle,” and denying that the waiting period is a substantial obstacle for even those 
women who experience it as “particularly burdensome”). Of course, the district court 
did not know that the magic words that would signal unconstitutionality were 
“substantial obstacle,” as it handed down its findings on the effect that the waiting 
period would have on indigent women well before the Court would make a finding of 
a “substantial obstacle” synonymous with unconstitutionality.  
 66 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 348-49 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(writing that the Court’s refusal to strike down the Hyde Amendment shows that 
“there truly is another world out there, the existence of which the Court . . . either 
chooses to ignore or fears to recognize”) (quotations omitted). 
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the increase in costs occasioned by a twenty-four hour waiting period 
are experienced not as “slight,”67 but rather as tragic. 
The most telling evidence that the Court in Casey does not wield the 
undue burden standard as a tool for effecting a moral imperative to 
save fetal “life” at all costs is the fact that Casey struck down 
Pennsylvania’s spousal notification provision, a provision that the 
Court notes might have saved fetal “life” at the expense of the 
autonomy of women in abusive relationships with their male 
partners.68 If the undue burden standard is a balancing test, which this 
Article argues in Part II, then the Court found that the abortion right 
of the woman involved in a relationship marred by domestic violence 
outweighed the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life. This result is 
impossible if the prenatal life is taken to be “life” since “life,” by virtue 
of its profundity and vulnerability, functions to outweigh anything 
against which it is balanced. 
The Court in Casey, like the Court in Roe, did not conceptualize the 
fetus as “life.” This judicial appreciation of the fetus continues in 
Carhart I, but it is abandoned quite dramatically in Carhart II. The 
discussion of Carhart I below should bring into greater relief just how 
much of a departure Carhart II is from the Court’s pre-2007 
jurisprudence of fetal life. 
3. The Fetus in Carhart I 
In Carhart I, the Court was called upon to determine the 
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that criminalized the dilation 
and extraction abortion procedure, or D&X.69 The Court struck down 
the regulation because it lacked a health exception and because the 
language of the law could also be read to proscribe the most 
commonly-used method of performing second and third trimester 
abortions (dilation and evacuation, or standard D&E).70 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion is consistent with Casey’s directive 
that the Court ought to be a dispassionate arbiter — the broker of a 
 
 67 Casey, 505 U.S. at 901. 
 68 Id. at 888-95 (citing the lower courts, amici briefs, and other studies 
demonstrating that the spousal notification provision would prevent women in violent 
relationships with their husbands from obtaining the abortion they desire). 
 69 Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 914 (2003). During the D&X 
procedure, which is interchangeable with the intact dilation and extraction procedure 
(“intact D&E”), the physician removes the fetus largely intact from the uterus. Id. at 
927-28. The D&X is to be counterpoised to the standard D&E procedure, during which 
the physician dismembers the fetus as it is removed from the uterus. Id. at 924-26.  
 70 Id. at 930. 
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compromise — in the nation’s war between those who support 
abortion rights and those who abhor them.71 The opinion begins with 
a conciliatory overture, giving voice to the standpoints of both sides of 
the abortion debate: “Millions of Americans believe that life begins at 
conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the 
death of an innocent child . . . . Other millions fear that a law that 
forbids abortion would condemn many American women to lives that 
lack dignity [and] depriv[e] them of equal liberty. . . .”72 Like Casey, 
the Court takes itself to be the institution that must strike the 
compromise between these (seemingly) fundamentally incompatible 
worldviews. It declares that it only strikes down the law after it has 
“tak[en] account of these virtually irreconcilable points of view, aware 
that constitutional law must govern a society whose different members 
sincerely hold directly opposing views, and considering the matter in 
light of the Constitution’s guarantees of fundamental liberty.”73 
Like Casey, the Court appears sympathetic to those who believe in 
fetal “life.”74 However, consistent with Casey, and as expected of a 
Court that takes itself to be a mediator between two sides engaged in a 
pitched war, it does not itself appear to be committed to those same 
ideas.75 Nor does it appear to be committed to a position that denies 
that the fetus, which the Court refers to as “potential human life,”76 
has any moral consequence. In fact, the Court appears ambivalent 
about the fetus’s moral status, vacillating between conceptualizing the 
fetus as morally analogous to an infant on the one hand and morally 
analogous to any living, biological organism on the other. Indeed, in 
the same section that describes the fetus as being composed of “friable 
tissue” that is not “easily broken” and must be subject to 
 
 71 In his dissent, Justice Scalia seems to rejoice in the seemingly apparent fact that 
Casey and the undue burden standard have been unable to broker a truce between 
both sides of the abortion debate. See id. at 955-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting, 
because he was “in an I-told-you-so mood,” his previous prediction in his dissent in 
Casey that the decision would be unable to be an effective compromise). 
 72 Id. at 920 (majority opinion). 
 73 Id. at 920-21. 
 74 It notes, for example, that its description of the procedure at issue in the case 
may be “clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to others.” Id. at 923. 
 75 And in that lack of commitment to fetal “life,” the Court may be accused of 
disbelieving the existence of fetal “life.” Such a result is expected when the conflict is 
constructed as a Manichean one within which there is no middle ground.  
 76 Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 923; see also id. at 930 (referring to the “potentiality of 
human life”). 
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“dismemberment or other destructive procedures,” the fetus is also 
described as moving through, not the “vagina,” but the “birth canal.”77 
The majority’s hesitant treatment of the fetus stands in relatively 
stark contrast to the way that other Justices would describe it. 
Consider Justice Scalia, who appears committed to the fetus’s intense 
moral consequence. In his dissent, Scalia refers to the fetus as “half-
born posterity,”78 the procedure at issue as a “live-birth abortion” that 
would “destroy[] the child,”79 and the law that would proscribe the 
procedure as “humane” and “anti-barbarian.”80 Yet, Scalia’s 
commitment to the fetus is more extensively (and dramatically) 
articulated by Justice Kennedy. Indeed, Kennedy plainly formulates 
the abortion debate and the views that may be held about the fetus as 
Manichean, and he interprets Casey as allowing states to do what is 
“right”: “States may take sides in the abortion debate and come down 
on the side of life, even life in the unborn.”81 For Kennedy, the life that 
the fetus embodies possesses a “sanctity”82; indeed, it has an “intrinsic 
value” that many “decent and civilized people” recognize.83 Although 
there are those who will be “insensitive, even disdainful,”84 to it, the 
fetus is nevertheless entitled to “dignity and respect.”85 Which is to 
say, in Kennedy’s opinion, the fetus is clearly a “life” — profound, 
sacred, vulnerable, and desperately in need of protection. In Carhart 
II, Justice Kennedy convinces four other Justices to agree with him and 
his conceptualization of “life,” as he writes the majority opinion in 
that discourse-changing decision. 
4. “Life” in Carhart II 
As noted above, Carhart II upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act (“PBA”), which criminalized the D&X (or intact D&E) 
technique of performing second- and third-trimester abortions.86 The 
Court upheld the statute, despite its lack of a health exception87 (and 
 
 77 Id. at 925. 
 78 Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. at 954. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 82 Id. at 965. 
 83 Id. at 979. 
 84 Id. at 961. 
 85 Id. at 963. 
 86 For an explanation of the procedure and its relationship to standard D&E, see 
supra note 69.  
 87 See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 162-63 (2007) (upholding 
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despite the fact that the Court had struck down just four years earlier 
a similar bill in Carhart I), on the theory that it furthered the 
government’s interest in “protecting the life of the fetus that may 
become a child”88 — a legitimate governmental pursuit per Casey’s 
explicit directive.89 
Had the ban functioned to substantially constrain a woman’s ability 
to terminate her pregnancy during her second trimester (prior to fetal 
viability) or terminate a pregnancy that threatened her life or health90 
during her third trimester (after the fetus reached viability), the Court, 
consistent with Casey, would have had to strike down the ban as an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion. However, because of 
the availability of other methods of abortion — that is, because 
women would be able to obtain an abortion despite the ban — the 
Court found that a ban on the D&X procedure did not function to 
constrain substantially a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion during 
those stages of her pregnancy.91 Accordingly, the federal PBA does not 
 
the ban despite the lack of a health exception based on the fact that Congress found 
that there was disagreement among physicians as to whether an intact D&E was ever 
safer than standard D&E). Moreover, “[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the 
exercise of legislative power.” Id. at 164.  
 88 Id. at 146 (emphasis added); cf. id. at 145 (noting that the government has a 
“legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life”). 
 89 Carhart II has been roundly denounced among proponents of the abortion 
right. See Laura J. Tepich, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to 
Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 382 (2008) (“This new standard becomes even more 
troubling . . . when one realizes how far it strays from the precedent established in 
Casey . . . . While claiming to use the undue-burden standard in Carhart, Justice 
Kennedy in fact employs rational-basis review . . . .”); see, e.g., Cynthia D. Lockett, The 
Beginning of the End: The Diminished Abortion Right Following Carhart and Planned 
Parenthood, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 337, 337-38 (2008) (suggesting that Carhart 
will lead to the reversal of Roe v. Wade); Martha K. Plante, “Protecting” Women’s 
Health: How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and Women’s Equal Right 
to Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 389, 389 
(2007) (arguing that “Carhart diminishes the rights extended in Roe v. Wade so 
significantly that it suggests a de facto overruling of Roe is imminent”); Sonia M. Suter, 
The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of Reproductive 
Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 
1569 (2008) (arguing that Carhart represents “an attempt to strengthen the Court’s 
weighting of the state’s interest in potential human life, which may one day uphold a 
ban of previable abortions”). 
 90 Whether the ban will function to threaten a woman’s health is subject to much 
debate within the medical community — a dissension that persuaded the majority to 
uphold the ban in spite of its lack of a health exception. See supra note 87. 
 91 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
availability of other abortion methods saves the ban from unconstitutionality). The 
most obvious alternative method is the standard D&E; however, other alternative 
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“protect” fetal life if “protection” means preventing abortions, a fact 
that the dissent notes.92 
So, either the undue burden standard does not require the courts to 
inquire into whether a regulation actually accomplishes the goal of 
“protecting” fetal life (by preventing abortion), or the Court does not 
take “protection” of fetal life to mean the “prevention” of abortion. 
The opinion suggests the latter: Congress appeared to be concerned 
with the intangible, cultural effects of the intact D&E procedure. 
Congress argued — and the Court accepted — that the D&X 
procedure would “coarsen” society, creating a culture within which 
the most brutal degradations of human life are tolerated.93 The fear 
was that D&X procedure would normalize brutality. As such, the 
protection of fetal life under Carhart II may be accomplished entirely 
discursively — by making, or remaking, culture.94 
In this way, Carhart II’s suggestion that the government’s interest in 
protecting fetal life may be achieved by entirely discursive work 
represents a departure from previous understandings of how this 
interest may be achieved. Casey suggests that fetal life is protected 
when abortion is prevented. Accordingly, the principal aim of the 
government pursuing this interest is not to create a society wherein 
human life in all of its various stages of development is respected. 
Instead, the principal aim of the government pursuing this interest is 
to prevent women from terminating their pregnancies. Consider 
 
methods are hysterotomy, by which the fetus is removed from the uterus via cesarean 
section, and hysterectomy, by which the entire uterus is removed from the woman. Id. 
at 140 (majority opinion). 
 92 Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Act scarcely furthers that interest 
[in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child]: The law saves not a single 
fetus from destruction . . . .”); see also Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 
930 (2003) (“The Nebraska law, of course, does not directly further an interest ‘in the 
potentiality of human life’ by saving the fetus in question from destruction, as it 
regulates only a method of performing abortion.”) (emphasis in original). 
 93 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 157 (“Implicitly approving such a brutal and 
inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen society to the 
humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it 
increasingly difficult to protect such life.”) (quoting Congressional Findings).  
 94 In his dissent in Carhart I, Kennedy made plain his belief that the state’s interest 
in the protection of fetal “life” is accomplished by making culture. Responding 
directly to the claim that because the ban on D&X did not prevent abortion, it did not 
further the state’s interest in protecting fetal “life,” Kennedy argued that it was 
sufficient that the ban merely “instructed” society on the value of “life.” See Carhart I, 
530 U.S. at 964 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“By its regulation, Nebraska instructs all 
participants in the abortion process, including the mother, of its moral judgment that 
all life, including life of the unborn, is to be respected.”).  
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Casey’s discussion of the Pennsylvania informed consent provision95: 
the Court did not uphold the regulation because of the discursive, 
cultural work accomplished by the information attempting to dissuade 
women from abortion. Rather, it upheld the regulation because the 
information “might cause the woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion”96 — in other words, it might prevent abortion. The Court 
offered a similar justification for upholding the waiting period, finding 
that it was “a reasonable measure to implement the State’s interest in 
protecting the life of the unborn” insofar as it offered a period of 
reflection within which women could contemplate the pros and cons 
of undergoing an abortion.97 Again, the Court does not uphold the 
waiting period because it creates a discourse or empowers an already-
existing discourse within which the dignity of human life is 
appreciated and underscored. Instead, the Court upholds the 
provision, despite the burden it would impose on the most vulnerable 
women seeking to exercise their abortion right,98 because it may 
prevent abortion. Thus, Carhart II represents a departure from Casey 
insofar as Carhart II accepts discursive, culture-building work as a 
proper aim of the state interested in protecting fetal life. However, this 
is not the largest difference between the two opinions. 
Rather, the most dramatic departure between Carhart II and Casey is 
the conceptualization of the fetus. Indeed, one of the most blatant and 
unapologetic aspects about the Court’s opinion in Carhart II is that it 
takes the fetus to be an entity deserving of the most profound respect 
— a “life.” That the fetus is much more than a biological entity 
sustained by the woman through biological processes is suggested by: 
the “womb”99 in which it resides prenatally; the “profound respect”100 
that states may show it; and the “profound” “anguish,” “sorrow,” 
“grief,” and “regret”101 that women feel post-abortion. It is important 
 
 95 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) 
(discussing the informed consent provisions of the Pennsylvania law). 
 96 Id. at 883. 
 97 Id. at 885. 
 98 Id. at 886 (accepting the District Court’s findings that the waiting period will be 
“particularly burdensome” for “those women who have the fewest financial resources, 
those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their 
whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others”). 
 99 Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (stating that “a fetus 
is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the 
womb”). 
 100 Id. at 157 (arguing that “[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory 
authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman”).  
 101 Id. at 159-60 (“It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to 
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to note that these are women who, but for their frequently uninformed 
actions,102 will develop a “bond of love” with their fetus-cum-infant 
that represents the apotheosis of “respect for human life.”103 
At certain points in the majority opinion, it may seem as though the 
Court is proceeding from a different premise about the fetus, accepting 
the fetus as no more and no less than a biological entity — a living 
organism, but hardly a “life.” Indeed, the Court occasionally describes 
the fetus “scientifically,” as when it notes “by common understanding 
and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within 
the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”104 However, 
this ostensible “scientific” contemplation of the fetus is in tension with 
the Court’s other clear contemplation of the fetus: the “womb”-
dwelling entity triggering “profound respect,” “profound grief,” 
“anguish,” and “sorrow.”105 Accordingly, even when the Court indexes 
the unchallenged biological fact of fetal life, it means morally-salient 
fetal “life.” In so doing, the Court quite seamlessly attaches moral 
“life” onto biological life — performing on a smaller scale the larger 
cultural processes that have made the biological fact of fetal life 
simultaneous to the moral fact of fetal “life.”106 As Duden explains, 
modernity has taken the fetus, an object from natural science, and 
invested it with moral and spiritual significance; the fetus has been 
invested with “life.”107 This imbuement is precisely what the majority 
does in Carhart II. 
So, the question for the Carhart II majority is not whether 
constitutional protection ought to be afforded to a specific technique 
of ending fetal biological life. The question that the majority is 
adjudicating is whether to afford constitutional protection to a 
procedure that ends — intentionally and, by most accounts, brutally 
— a “life.” Unsurprisingly, the Court answered in the negative. It is 
certainly true that the Court is quite concerned with the appearance of 
the D&X procedure; the fact that it looks to be a “normal” childbirth 
 
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she 
learns, only after the event, what she did not once know . . . .”). 
 102 See id. at 159 (arguing that some doctors would choose not to tell women 
contemplating abortion exactly what the procedure entails because of the doctors’ 
concern with the women’s already fragile emotional state).  
 103 Id. (arguing that “[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the 
bond of love the mother has for her child”).  
 104 Id. at 147. 
 105 Id. at 157-60. 
 106 For a discussion of the cultural processes that have made biological life 
concomitant to moral life, see supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 107 DUDEN, supra note 32, at 21. 
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until the physician collapses the fetus’s skull disturbs the majority.108 
While the Court is appalled by the aesthetics of the procedure, it is 
difficult to conclude that the Court would have reached a different 
result even had the procedure been less aesthetically displeasing. 
Which is to say, within the logic of “life,” there is no acceptable 
method to end it. As such, the slippery slope constructed by Carhart II 
is not that the logic of the majority opinion supports the 
constitutionality of criminalizing other abortion procedures, namely 
the standard D&E procedure.109 Instead, the slippery slope is that the 
Court has accepted “life” as the object of the abortion procedure, an 
entity that can never appropriately be terminated. 
This Part attempted to demonstrate that Carhart II represents a 
radical departure from precedent insofar as it accepted the fetus as a 
“life.” The next Part begins to determine the significance that this 
conceptualization of the fetus has on the undue burden standard. That 
analysis must begin with an inquiry into what kind of test the undue 
burden standard has revealed itself to be. 
II. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD: AN EFFECTS TEST, A BALANCING 
TEST . . . OR BOTH? 
So, what kind of test is the undue burden standard? Is it a balancing 
test — weighing the government’s interests against the rights of the 
individual — or something different entirely? Moreover, if it is a 
balancing test, what level of review is it? Is it an intermediate review 
that requires courts to determine whether a state’s important interest 
outweighs the individual’s liberty interest in abortion? Or is it just a 
glorified rational review that requires courts to determine whether a 
state’s legitimate interest outweighs the individual’s liberty? Scholars 
have arrived at different answers to these questions, in part because 
Casey did very little to explain the standard and how courts should 
use it. However, the least controversial description of the undue 
burden standard is that it is not strict scrutiny. Casey completely 
abandoned the rhetoric of “narrowly tailored” regulations designed to 
further “compelling governmental interests” — telltale signs of strict 
scrutiny110 — and replaced it with language concerning the 
 
 108 Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 160 (contending that intact D&E “perverts a process 
during which life is brought into the world”) (quoting Congressional Findings). 
 109 Cf. Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” 
Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2008) (describing the standard D&E 
procedure as equally “brutal” and “gruesome”). 
 110 Although Casey abandoned the rhetoric of strict scrutiny, some scholars argue 
that Casey did not abandon the conceptualization of the abortion right as 
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government’s “legitimate interests” (emphasis added)111 and telling 
silence about the required “narrow” fit between means and ends.112 
While it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that the undue burden 
standard is not strict scrutiny, it is harder to arrive at the conclusion of 
what exactly the standard is. There are several possibilities to the latter 
question. 
A. The Undue Burden Standard as Litmus Test for an Infringement of a 
Right? 
The undue burden test could be nothing more than an inquiry into 
whether a regulation has actually infringed a right. Professor Alan 
Brownstein has elaborated this argument. He writes that the undue 
burden standard obliges courts to interrogate whether a regulation 
actually constitutes an infringement of the individual fundamental 
right — an inquiry that is usually subordinated to interrogations into 
whether a constitutionally protected individual right/interest exists or 
whether a state interest justifiably infringes it.113 Brownstein 
 
fundamental. As such, they argue that the abortion right is an anomaly within 
constitutional law insofar as it is a fundamental right that is not protected by strict 
scrutiny. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 988 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Casey as holding that “a law which directly regulates 
a fundamental right will not be found to violate the Constitution unless it imposes an 
‘undue burden’” and arguing that, as a result of weakening the level of review that 
protects fundamental rights, the plurality shows a “willingness to place all 
constitutional rights at risk in an effort to preserve what they deem the ‘central 
holding in Roe’”) (emphasis in original); A Woman’s Choice — East Side Clinic v. 
Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing the post-Casey abortion right 
as “fundamental”); Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Abortion is 
recognized as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Valerie J. Pacer, Salvaging the Undue Burden 
Standard — Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights 
Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 313 (1995) (“The undue burden standard, however, 
subtly undermines the protective barrier surrounding any fundamental right. It allows 
the current political majority to actively interfere with its citizens’ exercise of their 
fundamental rights, so long as such interference does not amount to an undue burden. 
Because it allows such interference, the undue burden standard appears irreconcilable 
with traditional fundamental rights protection.”).  
 111 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming the proposition “that the State has legitimate 
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and 
the life of the fetus that may become a child”). 
 112 See Metzger, supra note 16, at 2032 (noting that after Casey, a “restriction on 
pre-viability abortions no longer needs to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest”). 
 113 See Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden 
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 870 (1994) (arguing that, 
usually, “the question of what constitutes an infringement of a right is treated as a 
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understands an undue burden as a determination that the regulation 
actually infringes the abortion right. The alternative — that the 
regulation is a constitutional, due burden — is a determination that 
the law infringes nothing.114 
However, if the undue burden standard simply tests whether a 
regulation infringes the abortion right as a fundamental right, then a 
finding of an undue burden should not result in the regulation’s 
unconstitutionality, as it currently does. Instead, a finding of an undue 
burden-qua-infringement should result in the application of strict 
scrutiny and an inquiry into whether the state has a compelling 
interest in infringing the right.115 Because this is not how the undue 
burden standard functions, it is inaccurate to describe it as merely a 
test of the presence or absence of an infringement. 
B. The Undue Burden Standard as an Effects Test? 
The undue burden standard could be an effects test. As such, it 
would require a reviewing court to gauge a regulation’s effect on the 
ability of a woman to access abortion.116 If the court determines that 
the path to abortion remains substantially clear, it may arrive at the 
conclusion that the regulation is constitutional. Alternatively, if the 
court determines that the regulation has placed a substantial obstacle 
in the path to abortion, it must conclude that the regulation is 
 
secondary concern,” but the undue burden standard elevates this question to a 
primary concern).  
 114 See id. at 879-81. 
 115 This was how the undue burden standard functioned when it first appeared in 
abortion jurisprudence. The “undue burden” language made an early appearance in 
the abortion funding cases, which established the principle that the government did 
not infringe indigent women’s abortion rights by prohibiting the use of Medicaid 
funds to help pay the costs of an abortion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 
(1980) (stating that Roe “protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference 
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy”) (quoting Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) 
(same). However, “undue burden” as a standard of review did not appear in abortion 
jurisprudence until Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983). In Akron, the finding of an “undue 
burden” did not mean that the regulation was unconstitutional; instead, it only meant 
that the court then had to review the regulation under strict scrutiny. See id. at 463 
(“The ‘undue burden’ required in the abortion cases represents the required threshold 
inquiry that must be conducted before this Court can require a State to justify its 
legislative actions under the exacting ‘compelling state interest’ standard.”). Moreover, 
“undue burden” was not synonymous with “substantial obstacle,” but rather “absolute 
obstacle[] or severe limitation[].” Id. at 463-64. 
 116 See Metzger, supra note 16, at 2034 (arguing that the “undue burden standard 
only analyzes the quantity of burdens imposed”). 
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unconstitutional. Notably, under this formulation of the standard, it is 
not a balancing test, as it does not require a court to balance the state’s 
interest in regulating abortion (i.e., in order to protect the woman’s 
health or to protect fetal life) against the woman’s right to abortion. 
Instead, the court need only calculate the effect that the law will have 
on abortion access. 
At first blush, describing the undue burden standard as an effects 
test seems to fly in the face of the language used in the Casey joint 
opinion, which suggested that courts must consider legislative 
purposes and effects when reviewing an abortion regulation.117 
However, the Supreme Court and most lower courts have refused to 
analyze abortion regulations’ purposes as separate from their effects.118 
Moreover, the Court’s opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong119 indicated 
the Court’s awareness of the possibility of disarticulating legislative 
purposes from legislative effects, as well as its skepticism about the 
possibility: 
[E]ven assuming . . . that a legislative purpose to interfere with 
the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the 
effect of interfering with that right . . . could render the . . . law 
invalid[,] there is no basis for finding a vitiating legislative 
purpose here. We do not assume unconstitutional legislative 
intent even when statutes produce harmful results . . . ; much 
less do we assume it when the results are harmless.120 
The pessimism of this language, coupled with the fact that the Court 
has yet to engage in a robust analysis of legislative purposes, suggests 
that the “purpose prong” of the undue burden standard has fallen by 
 
 117 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (“An 
undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect 
is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the 
fetus attains viability.”); see also Brownstein, supra note 113, at 881-82 (“Any fair 
reading of the language of the joint opinion . . . demonstrates that the ‘undue burden’ 
standard does not simply require a reviewing court to evaluate the magnitude of the 
burden to determine if it is sufficiently heavy to be undue. Rather, the plurality is 
proposing a fluid and complex analysis in which both the purpose and the effect of the 
challenged law must be considered to determine if it is constitutional.”).  
 118 See Wharton et al., supra note 16, at 377-78 (“Lower courts have tended to omit 
discussion of the purpose prong or to conflate it with the effects prong.”).  
 119 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971 (1997) (per curiam); Note, After 
Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed “Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2552, 2566 (2006). 
 120 Mazarek, 520 U.S. at 972 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).  
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the wayside.121 All that is left is an inquiry into effects. Accordingly, 
the standard may be properly described as an effects test. 
But, here is the twist: even if the test only purports to require courts 
to interrogate the quantity of the burden imposed by a regulation — 
that is, its effects — this may not accurately describe the process by 
which a reviewing court arrives at a determination about the quantity 
of a burden. Differently stated, the undue burden standard could 
incorporate balancing into what purports to be an effects test. 
Although Casey did not explicitly charge lower courts with the task of 
“balancing” the state’s interests against the right, liberty, or interests of 
the woman,122 this is the most accurate description of the test. Which 
is to say: balancing is implicit in the undue burden standard insofar as 
a reviewing court, when deciding how much of a burden a law 
imposes (in other words, its effects), balances the significance of the 
woman’s abortion right/liberty against the state’s interest. Essentially, 
courts engage in intuitive balancing. 
C. Balancing as a Part of Testing Effects 
Professor Stephen Gottlieb’s scholarship provides an instructive 
place to begin laying the contours of this argument. He has argued 
that many constitutional tests that appear to eschew balancing actually 
incorporate balancing; accordingly, ostensibly non-balancing tests 
frequently operate as a pretext for balancing.123 He argues that the 
Court appears to lay down a categorical rule in Herrera v. Collins, 
which held that constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom 
from cruel and unusual punishment did not entitle a person sentenced 
to death to a hearing on evidence suggesting his/her innocence when 
 
 121 Cf. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 1008 n.19 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s Stenberg concurrence “seems to suggest 
that even if the Nebraska statute does not impose an undue burden on women seeking 
abortions, the statute is unconstitutional because it has purpose of imposing an undue 
burden. . . . Justice Ginsburg’s presumption is . . . squarely inconsistent . . . with our 
opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong.”) (emphasis in original). 
 122 The Court does speak about the need for the reviewing court to “weigh” state 
interests against individual interests; however, it only does this in reference to Roe’s 
requirements. See Casey 505 U.S. at 853 (“The extent to which the legislature of the 
States might act to outweigh the interests of the woman in choosing to terminate her 
pregnancy was a subject of debate both in Roe itself and in decisions following it.”); id. 
at 871 (“The Roe Court recognized the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in 
protecting the potentiality of human life.’ The weight to be given this state interest, 
not the strength of the woman’s interest, was the difficult question faced in Roe.”). 
 123 Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 825, 832 (1994) [hereinafter Balancing Significant Interests]. 
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this evidence is discovered after the trial and when there was no 
“independent constitutional violation” in the earlier trial.124 In the 
Court’s observation that “the passage of time only diminishes the 
reliability of criminal adjudications,”125 Gottlieb argues that the Court 
here makes it clear that it is not only aware of, but is also sympathetic 
to, an argument about the government’s interest in the finality of 
convictions.126 Gottlieb contends that the Court takes this 
governmental interest and implicitly balances it against the 
individual’s due process and Eighth Amendment rights to a hearing on 
new evidence.127 The rule against post-conviction hearings on 
potentially exonerative evidence is the result of this intuitive balance. 
Essentially, in order to arrive at what looks like a categorical rule 
against post-conviction hearings on potentially exonerative evidence, 
the Court balances individual rights and governmental interests, 
ultimately finding that the latter outweighs the former. “The Herrera 
decision looks like a rule. But the Court’s discussion of finality made 
sufficiently clear its resort to balancing. . . . It wrote as if this were a 
categorical decision. . . . The categorization is a balancing act in 
masquerade.”128 
Gottlieb’s reading of Herrera is instructive insofar as it demonstrates 
that judicial determinations appearing to have nothing to do with 
balancing may be nonetheless a product of intuitive or implicit 
balances.129 Indeed, the distinction between balancing and other 
adjudicative methods may be that the former articulates the values 
being balanced, while the latter allows those same values to go 
unarticulated.130 With this difference in mind, it may obscure actual 
judicial processes to claim that judges merely quantify the burden that 
a regulation imposes in order to arrive at a decision that a law under 
review is or is not an undue burden on the abortion right. A more 
accurate description of this adjudicative process may be to state that 
judges intuitively balance the governmental interest that the 
regulation promotes against the woman’s right to/interest in 
 
 124 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).  
 125 Id. at 403. 
 126 Gottlieb, Balancing Significant Interests, supra note 123, at 831. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 831-32. 
 129 Cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 77-80 (2001) 
(noting that types of constitutional tests — such as purpose tests, effects tests, 
balancing tests, etc. — may be combined in practice, albeit implicitly). 
 130 Gottlieb, Balancing Significant Interests, supra note 123, at 836 (“[T]he 
difference between balancing and categorization has to do with which values are made 
explicit and which are left as unarticulated judgments.”). 
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terminating her pregnancy. If this description is correct, then there is 
the danger — especially subsequent to the Court’s decision in Carhart 
II — that judges will balance the state’s interest in protecting fetal 
“life” against the woman’s abortion right. If those are truly the 
elements being balanced, then it is highly likely that judges will 
frequently arrive at the determination that the “quantity” of the 
burden that a regulation imposes does not amount to an 
unconstitutional undue burden, as protecting “life” will invariably 
outweigh an individual right/liberty interest in abortion. 
It is not necessary to argue that Gottlieb’s description of adjudicative 
processes is correct in every case. Moreover, it is unwarranted to claim 
that judges always and necessarily engage in balancing when arriving 
at all of their determinations, including the categorical and effects-
based ones. However, Gottlieb’s theory does indeed accurately 
describe what is happening in the context of abortion.131 The Court 
has given legislatures express permission to consider fetal “life” when 
regulating. It should be unsurprising, then, that the Court (and lower 
courts) would consider fetal “life” and its relative weight against the 
woman’s right or liberty when determining whether the regulation has 
surpassed an unarticulated level of burdensomeness. 
Accordingly, the undue burden standard is a balancing test — albeit 
an implicit one. Thus, when a reviewing court determines that a 
regulation does not amount to an unconstitutional undue burden, the 
court essentially has found that the state’s interest outweighs the 
individual’s right. Conversely, when a reviewing court (infrequently) 
determines that a regulation is an unconstitutional undue burden on 
 
 131 It is worth noting the abundance of jurists and scholars who have made this 
argument — that effects tests often involve balancing — in other contexts. See, e.g., 
Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs., 387 N.W.2d 254, 
282 (Wis. 1986) (Steinmetz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that 
the majority’s “direct and immediate effect” test is, in essence, “a balancing test to 
determine whether the statewide benefits outweigh the effect of the legislation on 
local or private interests”); Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 57-8 (1997) 
(arguing that balancing is implicit in effects tests because, “as a logical matter[,] most 
courses of action have some tendency to contribute to a forbidden effect” and, 
consequently “an effects test must be cabined or qualified somehow: either by some 
categorical rule . . . or by a balancing test that allows the forbidden effect to be 
outweighed by the good that the questioned measure accomplishes”); Amit M. 
Schejter & Moran Yemini, “Eyes Have They, but They See Not”: Israeli Election Laws, 
Freedom of Expression, and the Need for Transparent Speech, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 411, 
444 (2009) (“At the end of the day, the dominant effect test was not much more than 
an ad hoc balancing test . . . .”); Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The 
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 701-04 (1968) (showing how there is 
balancing involved in classic establishment clause cases despite the fact that the test is 
focused on the purpose or effect of a law).  
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the abortion right, the court essentially has found that the individual’s 
right/liberty outweighs the state’s interest.132 
This is precisely what one court observed about an undue burden 
standard that arises in a context unconnected to abortion. In Medina v. 
Pacheco, the court was asked to review a jury instruction in order to 
determine whether it had focused the jury on the relevant inquiry.133 
The jury was instructed that it should decide whether the state’s 
removal of the appellant’s children from their home “constituted an 
undue burden on the Plaintiffs’ right to intimate familial relations.”134 
The court noted that the instruction’s “undue burden” language comes 
from case law, in which courts determine whether a plaintiff’s familial 
association rights have been violated by applying “a balancing test 
weighing the state’s interests in protecting children against the family 
member’s interests in his or her familial right of association. . . . 
Examining the parties’ interests in light of the facts of the case, we 
weigh those interests to determine whether the state official’s conduct 
constitutes an ‘undue burden’ on the family member’s rights.”135 
Fascinatingly, the appellants argued that the “undue burden” language 
did not adequately instruct the jury about the necessity of balancing 
competing interests: 
 
 132 When courts engage in balancing, they may balance the whole right against the 
whole state interest. However, courts generally are given more structure for the 
balancing. For example, a test may require that courts balance the magnitude of the 
infringement on the right against the state’s specific gain. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (“Accordingly, when evaluating a content-
neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not 
sufficiently rigorous. We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the 
injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government 
interest.”); cf. Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When 
Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 64 (2010) (“Although 
‘substantial burden’ and ‘compelling interest-least restrictive means’ are cast as 
independent measures, courts inevitably do a kind of balance, considering the 
government’s interest in conjunction with the degree of burden.”). Accordingly, with 
respect to the undue burden standard, one could argue that when an undue burden is 
not found, a court has determined that the state’s specific gain (that is, the extent to 
which fetal “life” is protected) outweighs the burden on the woman’s right to access 
abortion. Alternatively, when an undue burden is found, a court has determined that 
the burden on the woman’s right to abortion outweighs the state’s specific gain. 
Because of the weightiness of “life,” it may be that whenever the state manages to 
protect fetal “life” — no matter how microscopic the protection — it will be found to 
outweigh the burden on the woman’s right to abortion. Hence, the failure of courts to 
find undue burdens on the abortion right. 
 133 Medina v. Pacheco, No. 97-2013, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22533, at *4 (10th Cir. 
Sept. 14, 1998). 
 134 Id. at *10. 
 135 Id. at *11 (citation omitted). 
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They suggest the “undue burden” test eliminates any sense of 
balancing — that it led the jury to focus on whether the 
officers’ actions were intrusive without also considering the 
Medinas’ equally important protected family interest. Without 
an explicit reference to the counterbalancing interest, they 
argue, the instruction failed to give the jury any frame of 
reference for determining exactly what might be “undue.” . . . 
[W]e must disagree with the Medinas. The word “undue” 
connotes the balancing test required because it only has meaning 
in the context of weighing one thing against another. One cannot 
determine if some action was due or undue without 
considering the circumstances. . . . Because the competing 
interests at stake were fairly obvious — the instruction 
establishes the Medinas had a right to intimate familial 
association entitled to constitutional protection — and the 
word “undue” requires a balancing analysis, we do not have 
substantial doubt whether this instruction led the jury to 
conduct the required balancing test.136 
Similarly, in P.J. v. Utah, a district court explicitly observed that the 
“undue burden test” does not merely require a reviewing court to 
quantify the burden imposed by an action in order to determine 
whether it is undue. Instead, it requires a reviewing court to “balance 
the plaintiff’s right to familial association against the relevant interests 
of the state, considering the ‘severity of the alleged infringement, the 
need for the defendant’s conduct, and any possible alternatives.’”137 
Indeed, balancing is implicit in the undue burden standard. The 
next Part considers the implications of this. 
III. MAKING UP STUFF: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, GOVERNMENTAL 
INTERESTS, AND THE SCALE THAT BALANCES THEM 
Constitutional law scholar T. Alexander Aleinikoff has offered a 
highly influential meditation on the nature, and problem, of balancing 
tests within constitutional law.138 He distinguishes the Court’s present 
 
 136 Id. at *12-13 (emphasis added).  
 137 P.J. v. Utah, No. 2:05-CV-739 TS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72334, at *51 (C.D. 
Utah Sept. 22, 2008) (citations omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. P.J. v. 
Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 138 See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (asserting that while a “balancing operation” may be an 
inevitable part of any legal system, there are extreme dangers in a balancing approach 
that is overly simplistic). 
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inclination to submit most constitutional contests to balancing from 
an earlier time when Justices resolved contests with a more categorical 
approach.139 During this bygone era, Justices took the task before them 
as determining the kind of interests that were in competition, not the 
relative weight of the interests.140 The disposition of the case was 
determined by the Court’s characterization of the event that was the 
subject of the dispute.141 He writes, “Marshall did not hold for the 
Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland because the burden of the state’s tax 
outweighed the state’s interest in taxation. Webster’s argument in 
Gibbons v. Ogden was not persuasive because he demonstrated that the 
interest of the national government outweighed the interests of the 
states in regulating interstate commerce.”142 Instead of balancing the 
contending interests, the Court declared categorical rules: “The power 
to tax was the power to destroy; states could exercise police power but 
could not regulate commerce . . . .”143 
Aleinikoff argues that constitutional law in the age of balancing is 
quite different from the earlier period of adjudication by 
categorization. Moreover, his point is to argue that balancing is quite 
deficient for a variety of reasons.144 He observes that balancing 
provides a pretense of scientific objectivity to the act of judging145 — 
an act which is frequently, if not always, a profoundly subjective 
enterprise. Judges, like scientists, appear to place interests on an 
objective scale. Decisions are to be taken as merely announcements of 
the results of the procedure.146 However, the patina of scientific 
objectivity is illusory; subjectivity remains the engine of constitutional 
decision-making. Further, Aleinikoff contends that the language of 
science may alienate us from what are, ultimately, intensely 
 
 139 Id. at 949. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See id. at 945. 
 142 Id. at 949. 
 143 Id. 
 144 There are many defenders of balancing, however. Gottlieb is one, arguing that 
“balancing is an inherent aspect of any form of functional jurisprudence.” Stephen E. 
Gottlieb, Introduction: Overriding Public Values, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1-5 (Stephen E. Gottlieb, ed., 1993) [hereinafter Public Values] (emphasis added). 
But see Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 1001-03 (stating that “balancing is not 
inevitable” and maintaining that “[a]lthough balancing has spread through 
constitutional law, many constitutional cases are decided each Term in non-balancing 
ways”).  
 145 See Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 992-93 (noting that balancing only appears to 
be a ‘scientific’ method of adjudication). 
 146 See id. at 993 (making this argument). 
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philosophical questions about what kind of society we want to be and 
to create.147 Moreover, balancing is deficient because of the danger 
that, should the Court allow balancing to continue its slow infiltration 
into all corners of constitutional law, constitutional theory will lose its 
distinctiveness. It will become no more than and no different from 
argumentation over what is better social policy.148 However, 
Aleinikoff’s most trenchant critique of balancing as a constitutional 
adjudicatory method concerns the “problem of evaluation and 
comparison”149 of competing interests. The next section explores this 
dilemma. 
A. The “Problem” of Governmental Interests 
Most scholars have turned their critical attention to the “problem” 
of rights. Their concern has largely been whether the Court has 
correctly or incorrectly concluded that the Constitution supports (or 
fails to support) a particular individual substantive right.150 However, a 
smaller contingent has adjusted their focus to the question of 
governmental interests.151 These scholars, with a special interest in the 
“compelling” variety of state interests, have historicized the concept,152 
criticized the language of “compelling state interests,”153 queried how 
long the language and analytic might be used within constitutional 
 
 147 See id. (making this argument).  
 148 See id. at 992 (making this argument). 
 149 Id. at 972. 
 150 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 11, at 943 (concluding that the Court incorrectly 
concluded that the Constitution supports a right to abortion). 
 151 Gottlieb has observed that calling them “governmental interests” is a misnomer, 
as the interests of a government suggest “graft, corruption, honoraria, high salaries, 
and burgeoning bureaucracies . . . .” See Gottlieb, Public Values, supra note 144, at 7. 
He argues that a better term may be “compelling public purposes,” which suggests 
that the government is acting on behalf on the people. See id.  
 152 See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests and 
Constitutional Discourse, 55 ALB. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1991–1992) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Discourse] (noting that the notion of a “compelling state interest” has its 
predecessor in the doctrine of “necessity,” which the Founders conceptualized as 
enabling the needs of the community to trump and constrain the exercise of 
individual needs).  
 153 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny — From Strict Through Rational 
Bases — and the Future of Interests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALB. L. REV. 745, 
748 (1991–1992) (“The Court, however, invented the mumbo jumbo of compelling 
state interests, so we have these conferences on compelling state interests because that 
is the way they talk — not because it makes particularly good sense to talk that 
way.”). 
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law,154 and noted tensions in the way that the Court has used the 
concept.155 
In truth, inquiries about the legitimacy of rights and the legitimacy 
of governmental interests might be related, as individual rights and 
governmental interests may be conceptually interdependent.156 Not 
infrequently, individual rights are defined with specific relation to and 
in express consideration of government power.157 Indeed, rights have 
often arisen because of worries about governmental power: “[A]nxiety 
about abuse of power generates rights.”158 State power is that which 
traces the borders of the individual right and delimits its reach — not, 
as frequently imagined, another individual right.159 
As it concerns this Article, this scholarship has generated especially 
interesting insights about the absence of a theory of governmental 
interests in constitutional law.160 While the test is clear — individual 
 
 154 See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Shell Game of Interest Scrutiny: Who Must Know What, 
When, and How, 55 ALB. L. REV. 725, 733 (1991–1992) (predicting that the language of 
governmental interests would pass out of the constitutional vocabulary upon the 
retirement of Justices Brennan and Marshall). 
 155 See id. (arguing that when an interest that is deemed “compelling” in one state 
is not pursued in another state, the notion that the interest is “compelling” for any 
jurisdiction is undermined); see also Gottlieb, Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152, 
at 554 (describing compelling interests as “discretionary”).  
 156 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Power of Government, 27 GA. 
L. REV. 343, 361 (1993) (describing this interdependence). But see David L. Faigman, 
Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 756 (1993–1994) 
(arguing that government power and individual rights must be defined independent of 
one another and that it would be “illegitimate to define individual liberty by virtue of 
the majority’s reasons for acting”). 
 157 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 156, at 361 (“The right is not defined by some 
process independent of and external to consideration of the sensible scope of 
government powers.”). 
 158 Id. at 365. 
 159 See id. at 362 (observing that the “conceptual limit of the constitutional right is 
not . . . another right, but a power of government, supported and identified by 
reference to underlying interests”). 
 160 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 
CALIF. L. REV. 297, 326 (1997) (“[T]he current doctrine simply does not explain how 
legislative ends are to be evaluated, beyond describing the requirements that they be 
‘legitimate,’ ‘important,’ or ‘compelling.’ . . . [T]he current doctrine and tiers were not 
really designed with scrutiny of governmental purposes in mind . . .”); Fallon, supra 
note 156, at 350 (“Controversy surrounds the identification of unenumerated rights, 
but until recently at least, there has been little similar worry about government 
interests.”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 941 (1988) 
[hereinafter Compelling Governmental Interests] (“A survey of the governmental 
interests identified by both the full Court and its individual members in separate 
opinions indicates that such interests are subject to the same criticisms as 
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rights and liberties may be abridged when the government can proffer 
an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgment161 — it is 
unclear by what principles the Court may arrive at the conclusion that 
a proffered governmental interest is such that it may justifiably 
infringe a right. The question, then, is two-fold: (1) how may the 
Court deduce that a proffered state interest is legitimate?; and (2) how 
may the Court assign weight to that interest such that it may be 
balanced against a right? In its failure to articulate the principles by 
which it decides the existence and magnitude of state interests, the 
Court has been accused of being unprincipled in this regard.162 
With respect to the first question concerning the principles by 
which the Court can deduce that a state interest is a legitimate one, 
the question would be moot if the Court could just look to the text of 
the Constitution for an itemization of proper interests that the 
government may pursue via exercises of its power. However, such an 
itemization does not exist, although some scholars have made 
attempts at providing one.163 Moreover, even if there were an 
itemization within the Constitution, some legislator or jurist would 
invariably argue that the itemization was not exhaustive and that 
extra-textual interests exist as well. Accordingly, it is likely that state 
interests must have non-textual sources.164 However, what are these 
 
fundamental rights: their sources are ambiguous and their relative weights impossible 
to gauge.”). 
 161 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (noting 
that in order for the government to abridge the exercise of a constitutionally protected 
right, “subordinating interest of the State must be compelling”) (quoting Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).  
 162 See Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 982 (arguing that the weights of state interests 
“are asserted, not argued for”); Bhagwat, supra note 160, at 319 (“Across the 
spectrum, however, one central theme emerges from the literature: there is a need for 
a principled theory of permissible and compelling governmental purposes, and the 
Supreme Court has failed to articulate such a theory.”); Fallon, supra note 156, at 350 
(“[T]he derivation of government interests from the Constitution is notoriously loose 
and easy.”); Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 160, at 937 
(“[T]he Court’s treatment of governmental interests has become largely intuitive, a 
kind of ‘know it when I see it’ approach similar to Justice Stewart’s explanation of 
pornography.”). 
 163 See, e.g., Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 160, at 941-63 
(providing and analyzing an itemization of compelling governmental interests). 
 164 See Gottlieb, Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152, at 553-54 (taking note of 
an argument about whether governmental interests “should be understood as defined 
by the Constitution or by some extratextual source” and affirming his belief in the 
latter); see also Levinson, supra note 153, at 758 (noting an argument about whether 
interests are textual or nontextual and concluding that that there is “a fairly strong 
majority for the latter view” among the constitutional law scholars present at the 
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sources? And what are the processes by which interests are derived 
from these sources? Indeed, what is the source of the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal “life”? Is this the same source of the state’s interest in 
protecting the prosaic, biological life of the fetus? Just as the 
Constitution makes no explicit mention of the right to abortion, it 
makes no explicit mention of the state’s interest in protecting life or 
“life.”165 
With respect to the second question regarding the difficulty of 
balancing individual rights against governmental interests (once 
derived), the gravamen of the objection is that, in order to balance a 
right against an interest, the judge must use a scale by which 
ordinarily incomparable concerns can be compared. The origin of this 
scale is the vexing issue. It must not be that the personal preference of 
the Justice who authors the majority opinion is the “scale”; such an 
occasion would threaten to turn constitutional law into an “arbitrary 
act of will.”166 Differently stated, we may rightly feel that it is unjust if 
it were the simple personal preferences of the majority of the Court 
that led it to conclude that, as a matter of constitutional law, the state’s 
interest in protecting fetal life was weightier than a woman’s interest 
in avoiding motherhood. However, we may not feel that such a 
conclusion was unjust if an external scale of values led to the same 
result. Yet, we are rarely apprised of the scale; we are infrequently 
informed of how weights are assigned to interests. We must take a 
leap of faith and hope the scale exists and that we are just not privy to 
it. According to Aleinikoff: 
[In] those cases in which the Court simply does not disclose 
its source for the weights assigned to interests, [t]hese 
balancing opinions are radically underwritten: interests are 
identified and a winner is proclaimed or a rule is announced 
which strikes an “appropriate” balance, but there is little 
discussion of the valuation standards. Some rough, intuitive 
scale calibrated in degrees of “importance” appears to be at 
 
symposium at which he was speaking). 
 165 Justice Stevens noted this point in his concurrence in Casey. See Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Identifying the State’s interests — which the States rarely 
articulate with any precision — makes clear that the interest in protecting potential 
life is not grounded in the Constitution. It is, instead, an indirect interest supported by 
both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns.”). 
 166 Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 973. 
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work. But to a large extent, the balancing takes place inside a 
black box.167 
We must either be optimistic about the existence of the scale, or we 
may be pessimistic and assume that the scale is a fantasy — that it is 
Justices’ personal preferences that determine the results of balancing 
in any given case.168 
The problem is especially acute in the area of compelling state 
interests, as such interests by definition outweigh those rights that are, 
at least as imagined, entitled to the most respect — fundamental 
rights. If there is no theory guiding the Court in its determination that 
a state interest is compelling, the Court is free to find compelling 
interests wherever and whenever it pleases. The result is an end run 
around fundamental rights, with individuals being stripped of the 
guarantees contained in the Constitution.169 Moreover, if individual 
rights are properly understood as constraints on government power,170 
and individual fundamental rights are properly understood as 
imperative constraints on government power, then stripping 
individuals of their fundamental rights through unprincipled judicial 
recognition171 of compelling state interests allows government power 
to go unchecked. The need for a theory of compelling state interests is 
then underscored. How does a judge or Justice determine that an 
interest is compelling and that it is legitimately pursued to the 
 
 167 Id. at 976.  
 168 See id. (noting that, in the absence of substantive discussions of how interests 
are balanced, the “specter” of judicial decision-making as an act of power and will is 
raised). 
 169 See Gottlieb, Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152, at 549 (arguing that the 
concept of compelling interests “is both powerful and dangerous because it justifies a 
denial of protected rights and has often been used with that result”); Jed Rubenfeld, 
On the Legal Status of the Proposition that “Life Begins at Conception”, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
599, 603-04 (1991) (“On the whole, however, the compelling state interest doctrine 
remains an unstructured balancing test in which our constitutional guarantees may 
always give way to raisons d’état.”).  
 170 See Fallon, supra note 156, at 360 (“[R]ights sometimes derive from the interest 
in preventing abuses of government power . . . .”). 
 171 It might be important to note that “unprincipled judicial recognition” of 
compelling government interests is properly understood as a species of judicial 
restraint — not judicial activism. Essentially, the judiciary defers to legislative 
determinations of purposes that they may constitutionally pursue. See Gottlieb, 
Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152, at 555 (noting that judicial restraint implies 
“broad recognition of legislative powers” and “broad recognition of compelling 
purposes”). 
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detriment of an individual’s fundamental right? The Court’s 
jurisprudence offers no answer to the question.172 
B. Abortion and the Problem of Governmental Interests, Compelling or 
Otherwise 
1. A Compelling Governmental Interest in Protecting (Viable) 
Fetal Life? 
Considering the wealth of academic attention that has been given to 
the Roe majority opinion over its twenty-eight years, it should be 
unsurprising that Roe has been accused of being deficient in both 
respects mentioned above. While a tidal wave of ink has been spilled 
on the propriety of the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution is 
properly interpreted to support a fundamental right to terminate a 
pregnancy,173 reams of paper have been filled with debates concerning 
the propriety of the Court’s conclusion that there exists a 
governmental interest in protecting fetal life that is weighty enough, at 
the point of fetal viability, to abridge the woman’s right to an 
abortion.174 Blackmun, writing for the Court, offered viability as the 
point at which the presumably always extant state interest in 
 
 172 Accordingly, many have attempted to rise to the challenge, offering principles 
to guide the Court in its determination of whether or not a proffered state interest is 
compelling. Some have argued that interests are compelling when they are necessary 
to preserve the democratic state or the rule of law. See David Charles Sobelsohn, Of 
Interests Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U. L. 
REV. 462, 479 (1977) (arguing that “simple linguistic analysis” leads one to conclude 
that a “compelling state interest” is one that is so paramount that “a threat to it not 
only suggests, but actually compels government action” and that “[o]nly the interest of 
self-preservation can be so strong”); cf. Linde, supra note 154, at 726 (“[T]he word 
‘compelling’ denotes compulsion; one should not use ‘compelling’ if one does not 
mean compulsion.”). Others have asserted that interests are compelling when they 
advance the individual right that they would infringe. See Bhagwat, supra note 160, at 
340. Others still have argued that interests are compelling when they protect life, 
liberty, or property or advance equality. See Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental 
Interests, supra note 160, at 939 (“It is reasonable to contend that the same solicitude 
for life, liberty, and property that underlies the due process clause should underlie 
respect for legislative efforts to protect life, liberty, and property by other means and 
in other circumstances . . . . A fourth right that might serve as the justification for a 
compelling governmental interest is the obligation of equality, which is explicitly 
developed in five amendments.”). 
 173 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 174 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (holding that the state has an 
“important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life” and 
that this interest becomes compelling, and capable of overriding the pregnant 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, at viability).  
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protecting fetal life becomes compelling because it is then that the 
fetus “has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s 
womb.”175 However, as many have noted, Blackmun here does not give 
a particularly convincing explanation as to why the state’s interest 
becomes compelling at viability (as opposed to other stages of a 
pregnancy, like conception, quickening, or birth); instead, he merely 
defines viability.176 
Much of the critique of Roe’s determination that the state’s interest 
in protecting fetal life becomes compelling at fetal viability is not 
generally due to the belief that a compelling state interest should not 
have been found at that point, thereby allowing the individual’s right 
to an abortion to remain unfettered subsequent to fetal viability. 
Instead, the critique often comes from those who are also critical of 
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution to support an individual 
right to an abortion — especially the relatively expansive one that 
Blackmun’s majority opinion in Roe provided. Cases decided 
subsequent to Roe gave Justices opportunities to articulate their sense 
of the arbitrariness of Roe’s determination that the state’s interest in 
protecting life becomes compelling at viability. Just sixteen years after 
Roe, the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (upholding 
various regulations that functioned to limit the availability of abortion 
services)177 would write, “[W]e do not see why the State’s interest in 
protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the 
point of viability, and there should therefore be a rigid line allowing 
state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.”178 
 
 175 Id. at 163. 
 176 See Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 976 (arguing that Blackmun’s defense of 
viability as the point at which the state’s interest in protecting fetal life becomes 
compelling “is a definition of viability, not an explanation of value”); Ely, supra note 
11, at 924 (“Exactly why that is the magic moment is not made clear . . . . [T]he 
Court’s defense seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.”).  
 177 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989).  
 178 Id. at 519; see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“The State’s interest is in the fetus as 
an entity in itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of 
viability under conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly, the State’s interest, if 
compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability.”); City of Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[P]otential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at 
viability or afterward . . . . The choice of viability as the point at which the state 
interest in potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any 
point before viability or any point afterward.”) (emphasis in original).  
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2. A Legitimate Governmental Interest in Protecting Fetal Life? 
Then came Casey. And with Casey came the abandonment, 
arguably, of the conceptualization of the abortion right as a 
fundamental right179 — which, in turn, meant rejection of strict 
scrutiny review of abortion regulations and the concomitant 
irrelevance of inquiries into the compellingness of the state’s interest 
in protecting fetal life. However, while Casey removed from the table 
the question of when and why the Court ought to find that there exists 
a compelling state interest in protecting fetal life sufficient to override 
the fundamental individual right to abortion, another question moved 
to the forefront: when and why should the Court find that there exists 
a legitimate state interest in protecting fetal life sufficient to override 
the individual liberty interest in abortion? 
The interesting thing is that Casey did not have to defend its 
determination that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting fetal 
life; it could simply rely on the precedential value of Roe, which first 
argued that the state has such an interest.180 However, unexplored 
within the Roe decision was the question of whether the state’s interest 
in protecting fetal life is a permissible one. Similar to the way that the 
Court seemingly pulled from thin air viability as the point at which 
the state’s interest becomes compelling, it seemingly pulled from thin 
air the supposition that the state has an “important and legitimate 
interest”181 in protecting fetal life.182 There was no theory of 
compelling state interests to help the Court defend its finding of 
viability as that transformative moment at which the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal life became compelling. Similarly, there was no theory 
of state interests to help the Court defend its finding that the state 
even has a legitimate interest in “protecting the potentiality of fetal 
life.”183 
 
 179 For a discussion of scholarship that maintains that the abortion right remains a 
fundamental right that, quite anomalously, is not protected by strict scrutiny, see 
supra note 110.  
 180 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (stating that the state has an 
“important and legitimate interest” in protecting fetal life). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Cf. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 182 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the text of the Constitution provides no guidance to the 
Court on how to discern what a “legitimate” state interest is, and concluding that the 
concept is “an invitation for judicial exegesis over and above the commands of the 
Constitution, in which values that cannot possibly have their source in that 
instrument are invoked to either validate or condemn the countless laws enacted by 
the various States”).  
 183 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
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One could observe that, as a general principle of constitutional law, 
a governmental interest is legitimate as long as it does not violate 
another constitutional principle — like antidiscrimination184 or 
economic anti-protectionism.185 The Court’s holdings also provide that 
the “‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group[]’ [is] not 
[a] legitimate state interest[].”186 It would follow that if the interest in 
protecting fetal life violates no constitutional principle nor seeks to 
harm a politically unpopular group, then it is legitimate — requiring 
extensive interrogation by neither Roe nor Casey. 
However, one can begin an answer to the claim that a governmental 
interest in protecting fetal life violates no constitutional principle with 
Justice Stevens’s observation in Casey that “in order to be legitimate, 
the State’s interest must be secular; consistent with the First 
Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian 
interest.”187 If the belief that the fetus is a potential life/unqualified 
life/“life” is a theological claim, then the state’s interest in protecting it 
may be illegitimate. Scholars, philosophers, ethicists, and jurists have 
disagreed about how to answer this question.188 However, the question 
 
 184 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (stating that catering to private 
racial biases is not a legitimate governmental interest); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (stating that “[p]referring members of any one group 
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin” is an impermissible state interest 
because such preference constitutes “discrimination for its own sake”). 
 185 See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 106 (1994) 
(“Our cases condemn as illegitimate, however, any governmental interest that is not 
unrelated to economic protectionism . . . .”) (quotations omitted). 
 186 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); see also Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 446-47 (1985).  
 187 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914 (1992) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
 188 Compare Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 565-67 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that beliefs surrounding fetal life 
necessarily have a “theological basis” with “no identifiable secular purpose”), 
DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 155 (“We may describe most people’s beliefs about the 
inherent value of human life — beliefs deployed in their opinions about abortion — as 
essentially religious beliefs.”) (emphasis in original), LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE 
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 116 (1990) [hereinafter ABORTION] (arguing that “beliefs about 
the point at which human life begins” have a “theological source”), and Laurence H. 
Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law,” 87 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 21 (1973) [hereinafter Foreword] (arguing that a statement about fetal life 
“entails not an inference . . . from generally shared premises, whether factual or moral, 
but a statement of religious faith”), with TRIBE, ABORTION, supra, at 116 (“[A]s a matter 
of constitutional law, a question such as this, having an irreducibly moral dimension, 
cannot properly be kept out of the political realm merely because many religions and 
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can remain unresolved because it is without a doubt that arguments 
that the fetus is a potential life/unqualified life/“life” are moral 
claims.189 
3. One Theory: The Illegitimacy of a Governmental Interest in 
Protecting Fetal Life 
Recent developments in constitutional law suggest that it may be 
illegitimate for the state to use moral claims to constrain the ability of 
a segment of society to live the lives that they want to live. The most 
 
organized religious groups inevitably take strong positions on it.”). Nevertheless, it 
seems patent that one can make an argument in favor of fetal “life” without 
referencing religion. See, e.g., Sidney Callahan, Moral Duty to the Unborn and Its 
Significance, in THE SILENT SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE UNBORN IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
43, 49 (Brad Stetson ed., 1996) (“The unborn human being has value because it is a 
member of the human family and shares in the heritage of the human species. The 
human status and human potential of the dependent embryo deserve respect and 
protection . . . . Is human life a gift which we accept gratefully? . . . A vision of human 
bonding and the value of all the living urges us to answer yes.”) Justice White may 
have articulated the secular basis for protecting fetal “life” most eloquently: 
[O]ne must at least recognize, first, that the fetus is an entity that bears in its 
cells all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the species 
homo sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that species from all 
others, and second, that there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from 
a child or, indeed, an adult human being . . . . [T]he continued existence and 
development — that is to say, the life — of such an entity are so directly at 
stake in the woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy . . . . 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting). 
 189 See Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 133, 159 (1997) (describing beliefs about the fetus as “moral claims”). For 
arguments that the belief that the fetus is a life is more of a religious than a moral 
claim, see Ronald M. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be 
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 414 (1992) (“[B]eliefs about the intrinsic 
importance of human life are distinguished from more secular convictions about 
morality, fairness, and justice.”); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Law 
Making, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352, 379 (1985) (“If the moral status of the fetus and 
desirable legal policy are not resolvable on rational grounds, individuals must decide 
these questions on some nonrational basis. For many persons, the basis for judgment 
is supplied in whole or part by religious perspectives, which either indicate the fetus’ 
moral status or gravely influence one’s mode of thinking about it.”); Sanger, supra 
note 31, at 807 (stating that although the “life” referenced in the “culture of life” 
“sounds secular enough . . . its rhetorical value is much enhanced by its association 
with Christianity”); cf. Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 
70 IND. L.J. 331, 340 (1995) (suggesting that some “moral regulations are essentially 
religious in nature”).  
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legible sign of this is Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down a Texas 
statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy.190 The Court argued that 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, which 
upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing all manner of sodomy,191 ought 
to have been controlling.192 Justice Stevens contended that “the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding 
a law prohibiting the practice.”193 The Lawrence majority reformulated 
the claim in the language of governmental interests: “The Texas 
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”194 In its 
most expansive reading, Lawrence sounds the death knell for all 
morals-based regulations.195 However, for many reasons, such a 
reading is not very probable.196 More likely, Lawrence should be read 
 
 190 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (reversing the lower court’s decision to uphold the 
statute). 
 191 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
558. 
 192 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  
 193 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 194 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 195 See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that if the majority accepts Stevens’s 
proposition that a state’s belief that a practice is immoral could never constitute a 
legitimate state interest, then “[t]his effectively decrees the end of all morals 
legislation”). It is worth observing that the Court’s movement from Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (which held that a state could prohibit public 
nudity if it found the activity immoral) to City of Erie v. Pap’s, A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 
(1999) (which held that a state could prohibit public nudity only if it found that 
public nudity has negative “secondary effects”) suggests that we are entering a 
jurisprudential period in which the state may not legitimately legislate morality. 
 196 See John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. 
L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (“[R]ecent constitutional cases do not sound the death knell for most 
forms of ‘morals legislation.’ It is well within the constitutional authority of the states 
to achieve many, though not quite all, of the types of state interests traditionally 
associated with the ‘moral function of law.’”); Eric A. Johnson, Habit and Discernment 
in Abortion Practice: The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as Morals Legislation, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 573 (2005) (arguing that many aspects of the majority in Lawrence 
“leave open the possibility that indirect harm to persons or society could serve 
adequately to justify morals legislation”); Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on 
Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious 
Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2006) (arguing that “explicit reliance on 
moral rationales for law should not be banished altogether from the realm of 
legitimate government interests”). But see Gey, supra note 189, at 331 (arguing that 
“government policy must be premised primarily on some rationale other than 
morality” in order to pass constitutional muster); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based 
Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1233, 1289 (2004) (“Whatever credibility the Court might have possessed previously 
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to restrict the government’s ability to legislate morality when the 
legislation demeans197 or could sanction discrimination against198 an 
identifiable group in society. Stated differently, pursuit of a moral 
conviction is an illegitimate state interest when the morals-based 
regulation enacted in pursuit of the conviction would violate 
principles of antidiscrimination. If this is a proper reading of 
Lawrence, then there is an argument that regulations motivated by the 
state’s interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life199 are illegitimate 
inasmuch as they are based on a moral claim that has the effect of 
demeaning or sanctioning discrimination against women. Women are 
demeaned insofar as their decision-making capacities are called into 
question by states that attempt to protect fetal life through the 
informed consent process. Legislation that tries to convince a woman 
that the moral status of the fetus that she carries demands the 
continuation of the pregnancy ostensibly proceeds from the 
 
to announce moral consensus on particular issues has slipped away entirely . . . . The 
lack of an authoritative alternative to majoritarian preferences that could enable 
meaningful, objective assessment of proposed moral justifications has reinforced, in 
turn, the Court’s disinclination to rely on morality-based justification.”). 
 197 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (arguing that legislation that punishes sexual 
activities in which gay persons engage “demeans the lives of homosexual persons”).  
 198 See id. (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, 
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”). For a similar reading 
of Lawrence, see Johnson, supra note 196, at 566, which notes that part of the impetus 
of the decision in Lawrence was the Court’s “recognition of the relationship between 
sodomy laws and other forms of discrimination against gays and lesbians.”  
 199 The state may legitimately regulate abortions of viable fetuses because, although 
the regulation remains based on a moral claim about the significance of the fetus at 
that stage of development, and the state’s pursuit of the moral claim may compel 
women to become mothers, a larger moral consensus has developed around the viable 
fetus. Because there is a moral consensus that has developed around the viable fetus, 
regulations of abortions of viable fetuses lose their cognizability as moral regulations. 
Essentially, the logic is that, in the face of a moral consensus, a moral claim is less 
cognizable as a moral claim; alternately, in the face of a moral dissensus, a moral claim 
is more cognizable as a moral claim.  
Consider murder. A law prohibiting murder might be based on a moral claim that it 
is wrong to kill another person. However, that moral claim is less cognizable as a 
moral claim in light of the moral consensus around the wrongfulness of killing others. 
Compare this law with a law proscribing “homosexual sodomy.” Such a law might be 
based on a moral claim that homosexual sodomy is wrong. Moreover, that moral claim 
is highly cognizable as a moral claim in light of the moral dissensus around the 
propriety of sexual relations between members of the same sex. 
In light of this, because we do not witness the same moral consensus having 
developed around the pre-viable fetus, then regulations of abortions of pre-viable 
fetuses are properly recognized as moral regulation. 
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assumption that women have not thought about the consequences of 
their decisions to terminate their pregnancies.200 Moreover, morals-
based regulations enacted in pursuit of the state’s interest in protecting 
fetal life sanction discrimination against women because, essentially, 
they attempt to coerce women into becoming mothers. In this attempt, 
they legitimize the belief that women are properly mothers — the 
consummate stereotypical gender role.201 As such, these regulations 
sanction discrimination against women who reject stereotypical 
gender roles. In sum, the state’s interest in protecting fetal life may 
function to demean and sanction discrimination against women, 
making pursuit of its moral claim an illegitimate state interest, 
consistent with the Court’s holding in Lawrence. 
The uninterrogated assumption made in Roe that the state has a 
legitimate interest in protecting fetal life has gradually transformed 
with Carhart II into an assumption about the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal “life.” Moreover, the thrust of this Article is to argue 
that this assumption could ultimately prove fatal to the abortion right. 
The advent of the protection of fetal “life” as a state interest 
underscores the need for a developed theory of state interests. As this 
Article will argue in the next Part, fetal “life” is such a momentous 
proposition that, when a government pursues the protection of this 
concept, it is implausible that any individual right or liberty will 
outweigh it in a balancing test. The concept comes into being as the 
gravest of propositions. Moreover, embedded within the very concept 
of fetal “life” is its own vulnerability. Indeed, the concept presupposes 
its own desperate need for protection. As both profoundly grave and 
profoundly susceptible to destruction, fetal “life” necessarily defeats 
rival concerns; certainly, the concerns that lead women to decide to 
terminate a pregnancy, including her interest in safeguarding her 
health,202 pale in comparison to the magnitude of fetal “life.” Should a 
theory of state interests lead to the conclusion that the protection of 
 
 200 See Corbin, supra note 61, at 1010 (arguing that biased counseling laws insult 
women as autonomous decision makers insofar as the state attempts to change their 
minds about a decision that most women surely contemplate extensively before 
making).  
 201 Cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1992) (noting 
that abortion restrictions embody and enact value judgments about the proper roles 
that women can assume in society).  
 202 It bears noting that Professor Ely expressed skepticism that a woman’s interest 
in her health ought to defeat the state’s interest in protecting fetal life. See Ely, supra 
note 11, at 921 n.19 (arguing that Roe got it wrong when it held that there had to be 
health and life exceptions to abortion prohibitions during the third trimester).  
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fetal “life” is a valid pursuit of government, the abortion right would 
have to reckon with its inevitable outweighing. However, a theory of 
state interests would first have to declare the legitimacy of the 
protection of fetal “life” as a goal of the state. Until such a theory is 
developed, we ought to be skeptical of the advent of an interest that 
functions to always and necessarily defeat a right once articulated as 
fundamental. 
IV. “LIFE” AND THE DEFEAT OF BALANCING TESTS 
When the protection of fetal “life” is a governmental interest against 
which any right or liberty is balanced, it most assuredly will be 
deemed weightier than that against which it is balanced. Essentially, 
the protection of fetal “life” will defeat a woman’s interest in terminating a 
pregnancy under all balancing tests, from the undue burden standard to 
strict scrutiny. “Life,” as culturally constructed, is such a weighty 
proposition that it necessarily outweighs any individual right or 
liberty. 
A. The Present Undue Burden Standard 
Under the present formulation of the undue burden standard, no 
regulation passed in the pursuit of the protection of fetal “life” will be 
found to be an unconstitutional undue burden on the abortion right. 
This result occurs principally because the undue burden standard is a 
balancing test, and fetal “life” is one of interests that must be balanced. 
As discussed above,203 the standard is ostensibly an effects test that 
requires a reviewing court to quantify the burden that a regulation 
places upon the abortion right. If the court finds that the effect of the 
law is unduly burdensome on abortion access, it must strike down the 
law; alternately, if the court finds that the effect of the law is not 
unduly burdensome, the law must be upheld. However, as observed, 
the undue burden standard requires balancing, albeit implicitly. That 
is, in arriving at the conclusion that the effect of the law is or is not 
unduly burdensome, the judge tacitly balances the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal “life” against the woman’s right.204 The result of that 
balancing determines the result of the judge’s quantification of the 
burden. If the interest in fetal “life” outweighs the abortion right, the 
law’s effect on abortion access will not be found to be weighty enough 
to constitute an undue burden. If the abortion right outweighs the 
 
 203 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 204 See supra Part II.C. 
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interest in fetal “life,” the effect found will be sufficiently weighty to 
constitute an undue burden. 
Ultimately, as long as the standard is a balancing test, the results 
will be the same. To put it simply, if fetal “life” is an element in a 
balancing test, it will necessarily outweigh the competing interest 
against which it is balanced. This is because fetal “life” is unmatched 
in its profundity. Accordingly, it is impossible that those who believe 
the fetus to embody “life” could find that any other pursuit outweighs 
it. The woman’s interest in pursuing higher education or career 
advancement, in averting enduring poverty, in extricating herself from 
a physically or emotionally abusive relationship (or simply extricating 
herself from an unfulfilling relationship), in continuing or changing 
the trajectory her life has taken thus far, in avoiding the stigma of 
single motherhood or welfare dependency, in avoiding being 
physically harmed by continuing an otherwise wanted pregnancy,205 in 
protecting her own life, etc. — all of these interests pale in comparison 
to fetal “life.” “Life,” easily and necessarily, trumps all of these. 
And this is precisely what the undue burden standard has yielded 
since Carhart II’s implicit directive that governments may properly 
pursue the protection of fetal “life” — and courts may recognize as 
legitimate the government’s pursuit of the protection of fetal “life.” 
Courts have had ample opportunity to demonstrate this aspect of the 
undue burden standard insofar as there has been a deluge of 
regulations passed by states that purport to further the interest in 
protecting fetal “life.” These regulations take the form of fetal pain 
laws,206 biased informed counseling laws,207 and ultrasound viewing 
 
 205 As noted above, Carhart II’s upholding of the federal PBA without a health 
exception arguably signals the waning of the requirement in Roe and Casey that the 
state’s pursuit of the protection of fetal life must yield to the woman’s interest in her 
own health, if not her life. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.  
 206 Arizona, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Utah have all passed laws that 
require women to be told that their fetuses are capable of feeling pain. See State 
Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. 
 207 See, e.g., L.B. 594, 101st Leg. 2d Sess (Neb. 2009), available at 
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/101/PDF/Final/LB594.pdf (imposing onerous 
informed consent requirements).  
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laws.208 Moreover, they have been largely upheld when reviewed under 
the undue burden standard.209 
 
 208 Twenty-one states have some kind of requirement with respect to viewing 
ultrasounds, ranging from actually making the woman view the image to requiring the 
physician to offer to display an ultrasound image. See State Policies in Brief: 
Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.  
 209 See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed 
Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 115 (2008) 
(demonstrating that laws regarding information that must be given to a woman before 
allowing her to obtain an abortion have generally been upheld when the court’s 
analysis looks at burdens, though they sometimes are struck down under strict 
scrutiny). Courts tend to reject facial challenges to informed counseling laws. See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 667-70 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated 
in part on reh’g en banc, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part on reh’g en banc, 
686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that laws requiring doctors to inform a woman 
that her fetus is a “living human being” and that she has a protected “relationship” 
with the unborn child are not facially invalid since they do not cause undue burdens 
in all cases). But see, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 
1048, 1063 (D.S.D. 2011) (granting a preliminary injunction against requirements 
that a woman must get counseling from a “Pregnancy Help Center” before being 
allowed to obtain an abortion in part because forcing a woman to disclose her decision 
to an irrelevant third party is degrading); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. 
Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1045 (D. Neb. 2010) (enjoining an informed 
consent legislative bill that required doctors to preform extensive preabortion 
assessments and subjected them to civil liability because it would have a chilling effect 
of discouraging doctors from providing abortions, creating an undue burden and 
depriving women of due process of law); Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 
227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1202 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (enjoining a law requiring informed 
consent to women who had ectopic pregnancies or fetuses with lethal anomalies 
because these women had no chance of successfully delivering a child so this 
information was irrelevant). Laws requiring the presentation of medical information 
are also usually upheld because courts do not find objectively truthful information to 
be an undue burden. See, e.g., Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. 
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2012) (arguing that medical information, such as a 
sonogram, is not an undue burden because information regarding fetal development is 
relevant to deciding whether or not to have an abortion and this information is 
“inherently truthful and non-misleading”); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 492-93 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that laws requiring doctors to inform a woman that she had the 
option to listen to the fetal heartbeat did not cause an undue burden because this is 
truthful medical information). Critics of these laws feel that they do create an undue 
burden because they serve as a lesson in morality to women and do not allow them to 
opt out if they have already reached a decision. See Sarah E. Weber, Comment, An 
Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion 
Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 367-68 (2009) (arguing that forced viewing of an 
ultrasound is an undue burden). But see Katherine E. Engelman, Fetal Pain Legislation: 
Protection Against Pain is Not an Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 279, 316 
(2007) (arguing that fetal pain laws are necessary for the protection of unborn 
children and that they merely serve to inform rather than to persuade).  
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Essentially, the undue burden standard has been woefully unable to 
protect the abortion right from nullification. This nullification, 
moreover, is a product of the incorporation of fetal “life” into what is a 
balancing test. The outcome will not be remedied until fetal “life” is 
extracted from the test — until protecting fetal “life” is no longer an 
interest that the state may legitimately pursue. 
B. Strict Scrutiny 
Some proponents of the abortion right have argued that the only 
way to prevent it from being diminished by various forms of 
incrementalist regulation is to recognize its fundamentality and to 
protect it with nothing less than strict scrutiny.210 Their argument is 
that strict scrutiny, and only strict scrutiny, is capable of striking 
down regulations that restrict women’s access to abortion services. 
However, strict scrutiny, like intermediate scrutiny and rational basis 
review, is a balancing test.211 And the strength or efficacy of any 
balancing test depends on the elements that are plugged into the test. 
Moreover, when fetal “life” is plugged into the strict scrutiny test, the 
test is rendered into any other balancing test that has been ineffective 
at protecting a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. 
The standard formulation of strict scrutiny is that a regulation 
burdening a fundamental right will be struck down unless the state 
can demonstrate that the law pursues a compelling interest. Moreover, 
the means to pursuing that interest must be narrowly tailored to 
accomplish the ends.212 There should be no doubt that protecting fetal 
“life” would qualify as a “compelling” governmental interest. As this 
Article has argued, “life” cannot be fairly described as anything but 
compelling; thus, the protection thereof is one of the most compelling 
activities that a government can undertake. Accordingly, the only 
 
 210 See e.g., Wharton et al., supra note 16, at 327-28 (discussing cases in which 
abortion restrictions were reviewed with strict scrutiny under state constitutions, and 
arguing that strict scrutiny, unlike the undue burden standard, offered robust 
protection of abortion right by being able to strike down various incrementalist 
regulations). 
 211 This Article strongly argues that strict scrutiny should be understood as a 
balancing test — requiring courts to balance the weight of the fundamental right 
against the weight of the state’s interest. Only a compelling state interest will be found 
to outweigh a fundamental right. However, some disagree that strict scrutiny is 
properly understood as a balancing test. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 129, at 84 
(arguing that strict scrutiny is not a balancing test because, “[e]ven if something 
approaching the form of balancing is observed,” it is unhelpful to describe the test as 
involving balancing because it is frequently “‘fatal in fact’”). 
 212 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
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open inquiry for a reviewing court is whether the regulation is 
narrowly tailored to accomplishing the protection of fetal “life.” 
Skepticism should follow any assertion that a regulation would be 
struck down on those grounds. Again, this is because of the nature of 
“life.” Even the most unwieldy of regulations would likely be upheld 
because of the profundity — and the profound vulnerability — of the 
object being pursued. 
CONCLUSION 
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu perhaps most eloquently described the 
dialectical relationship between law and culture when he observed, “It 
would not be excessive to say that [law] creates the social world, but 
only if we remember that it is this world which first creates the law.”213 
The advent of a state interest in the protection of fetal “life” 
demonstrates the dialectical relationship between law and culture. The 
notion of “life” is the product of many disparate and far-ranging 
cultural practices. However, deserving at least some credit for its 
development and for its saturation into culture — for its maturation 
into something that is commonplace in the United States — is the law. 
Specifically, the interpretation of the Constitution to support a 
woman’s right to determine whether she will become a mother 
provided fertile grounds for the development of a backlash. The 
cultural concept of “life,” as the object of the abortion procedure, is 
properly understood as part of the backlash. This Article has argued 
that, with Carhart II, the cultural notion of “life” has become 
embedded within law. And, Carhart II, as law, will undoubtedly spur 
cultural responses. Therein lies the dialectical relationship between 
law and culture. 
It should come as no surprise that law produces culture and that 
culture produces law. Law is, fundamentally, a cultural phenomenon. 
However, more than merely reflecting the culture from which it 
emerges, the law has been charged with the task of directing that 
culture. Allowing the undue burden standard to become embedded 
with “life” makes impossible the standard’s task of directing culture to 
accommodate sometimes radically different perspectives on the fetus. 
For those who believe that this accommodation is an essential 
function of the Constitution, it is imperative that we recognize the 
perversion of the undue burden standard and act to extract “life” from 
this particular balancing test. 
 
 213 Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 839 (1987) (emphasis removed). 
